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We can say two things with a high degree of confidence about clean 
energy policy in 2011.  First, a price on carbon is a desirable, if not a 
necessary1 element for a transformative energy policy.2  Second, the 
 *  Dean Emeritus and the Wilbert & Helen Ziegler Professor of Law, University 
of Cincinnati College of Law. 
 1. See JOHN M. DEUTCH, AN ENERGY TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION WILL IMPROVE 
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S EFFORTS TO ACCELERATE ENERGY INNOVATION (May 
2011), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2011/05_energy_ 
corporation_deutch/05_energy_corporation_deutch_paper.pdf; Robert N. Stavins, 
Both Are Necessary, But Neither Is Sufficient: Carbon-Pricing and Technology R&D 
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112th U.S. Congress will not address climate change legislation.  While 
the 111th Congress came close to passing the Waxman-Markey bill that 
contained cap-and-trade provisions, that proposal was the victim of 
debilitating Washington politics.3  The federal role in clean energy politics 
has been diminished substantially, certainly in the legislative branch.  
Nevertheless, the development of or movement toward a clean energy 
future is not only desirable, but offers multiple returns on any investment 
we make today.4  The longer we wait, the more we will pay.  The 
Department of Energy (“DOE”) notes the urgency of a clean energy 
transition and the need for a “new industrial revolution” to increase the 
likelihood of future economic prosperity.5 
Prospects for U.S. leadership, domestically and internationally, in 
addressing climate change are dim.  World leadership also appears lacking 
to the point at which moving forward on climate change appears incoherent 
and spasmodic at best.  Lord Anthony Giddens, for example, has written, 
“we have no politics of climate change.”6  Giddens may well be in 
despair, yet he is not alone in his despair as other energy analysts assess 
global climate change activities as being in gridlock.7  From the federal 
perspective, his argument seems correct: the U.S. has no politics of “climate 
change.”  Nevertheless, the country may address climate change indirectly 
by focusing on clean energy, by transforming our traditional fossil fuel-
based energy policy, and by recalibrating our traditional energy economy. 
This article argues that the United States can achieve a new and smart 
energy policy and that we are taking active steps in this direction.  Off of 
the Hill, at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, there is clear thinking about 
clean energy.  Consider President Obama’s choice for Secretary of 
is-sufficient-carbon-pricing-and-technology-rd-initiatives-in-a-meaningful-national-
climate-policy/. 
 2. Joseph P. Tomain, Our Generation’s Sputnik Moment: Regulating Energy 
Innovation, 31 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 389 (2011) [hereinafter Our Generation’s Sputnik 
Moment]. 
 3.  See, e.g., Ryan Lizza, As the World Burns: How the Senate and the White 
House Missed Their Best Chance to Deal with Climate Change, THE NEW YORKER (Oct. 
11, 2010), http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/10/11/101011fa_fact_lizza; RON 
PERNICK ET AL., CLEAN ENERGY TRENDS 2010 (Apr. 2010), available at http://www. 
cleanedge.com/reports/clean-energy-trends-2011. 
 4. See JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, ENDING DIRTY ENERGY POLICY: PRELUDE TO CLIMATE 
CHANGE (2011) [hereinafter ENDING DIRTY ENERGY POLICY]. 
 5. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, STRATEGIC PLAN 3 (May 2011), available at 
http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/DOE_2011-Strategic-Plan_Medium-Resolution_Print-
Quality.pdf [hereinafter DOE STRATEGIC PLAN] . 
 6. ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE POLITICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 4 (2009). 
 7. See, e.g., DAVID G. VICTOR, GLOBAL WARMING GRIDLOCK: CREATING MORE 
EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES FOR PROTECTING THE PLANET (2011); see also NICHOLAS STERN, 
A BLUEPRINT FOR A SAFER PLANET: HOW TO MANAGE CLIMATE CHANGE AND CREATE A 
NEW ERA OF PROGRESS AND PROSPERITY (2009). 
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Commerce, John Bryson.  Bryson has been the CEO of a public electric 
utility, a founder of the Natural Resources Defense Council, and sits on 
the boards of such organizations as Boeing and Disney and clean energy 
firms like Coda Automotive and BrightSource Energy8—exactly the 
right job description for a clean energy advocate.9  Additionally, the DOE 
has made U.S. leadership in clean energy technologies its first priority.10  
Clean energy, at its core, is about business as much as it is about the 
environment.11  Simply, public and private sector actors beyond the Beltway 
are crafting a clean energy agenda and promoting a new energy economy. 
This article describes the path for adopting that policy and sketches 
the politics of clean energy.  This path is smoother than attempting to 
pass climate change legislation because there is a significant consensus 
about what the contours of a clean energy policy should be and there is 
an emerging clean energy politics that will drive that change.  Much of 
the politics is occurring off Capitol Hill and beyond the Beltway.  Clean 
energy politics are emerging despite the lack of Congressional leadership.  
The clean energy agenda is wise because a transition to a clean energy 
portfolio can promote environmental protection, stimulate the economy 
though innovation and job creation, advance national security and 
ultimately reduce the cost of energy consumption. 
For the purposes of this article, the concept of a clean energy policy is 
defined as: (a) an aggressive reduction in oil and coal consumption; 
(b) the use of natural gas as a transitional fuel once hydraulic fracturing 
(“fracking”) is adequately addressed;12 and, (c) the rapid expansion of 
 8. James Calmes, Commerce Choice Draws Praise for Background, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 31, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/01/us/politics/01commerce.html. 
 9. Tomain, Our Generation’s Sputnik Moment, supra note 2, at 405–07. 
 10. DOE STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 5, at 9. 
 11. See, e.g., AMERICAN ENERGY INNOVATION COUNCIL, A BUSINESS PLAN FOR 
AMERICA’S ENERGY FUTURE (2010), available at http://www.americanenergyinnovation. 
org/full-report. 
 12. Hydraulic Fracturing (“fracking”) has become newsworthy for two reasons.  
First, recent exploration of the Marcellus shale formations promise to provide substantial 
amounts of domestically produced natural gas (up to 20% of the country’s natural gas 
need by 2020).  For the most part, that gas will be used to generate electricity.  Second, 
environmental concerns have been raised about the impact on drinking water and 
groundwater.  Congress has charged the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) to 
study and report by late 2012 on the environmental consequences of that process.  See 
Hydraulic Fracturing, EPA, http://water.epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic/class2/hydraulic 
fracturing/index.cfm (last visited Sept. 12, 2011).  The EPA has submitted a draft report 
for review by the agency’s Science Advisory Board.  See EPA, DRAFT PLAN TO STUDY 
THE POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF HYDRAULIC FRACTURING ON DRINKING WATER RESOURCES 
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energy efficiency and renewable resources.13  Of course, this very general 
definition is neither nuanced nor comprehensive.14  It is intentionally 
ambiguous, for example, about nuclear power.  Nevertheless, it will serve as 
a marker for a discussion of the politics involved in making this vital 
transition. 
 The question is fairly presented: How does a national clean energy 
policy become officially adopted?  This article describes the necessary 
elements for such a proposal to be adopted and argues that we, as a 
country, are more than half the way there.  Of course, even “more than 
half the way” to the clean energy goal line is still a failure to score.  Yet, 
the momentum toward a clean energy future is strong, the players are 
serious and many, and the policy choices are clear.  What remains to be 
done is custom tailoring the political conversation to advance a clean 
energy agenda independent of an effort to address climate change.  
Fortunately, there is no either/or choice between clean energy and climate 
change.  Rather, clean energy and climate change are complementary 
policies that can proceed simultaneously without one undermining the 
other.  Nevertheless, the smart political choice is to focus on a smart 
energy future by designing an energy policy that is responsive to the 
threats posed by a warming planet while concentrating on clean energy 
markets and a new economy rather than on possible limits to resource 
use and economic growth.15 
(2011), available at http://water.epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic/class2/hydraulicfractur 
ing/upload/HFStudyPlanDraft_SAB_020711-08.pdf.  See also BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR. & 
AM. CLEAN SKIES FOUND., TASK FORCE ON ENSURING STABLE NATURAL GAS MARKETS 
(2011), available at http://www.bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/BPC-ACSF%20 
Task%20Force%20on%20Ensuring%20Stable%20Natural%20Gas%20Markets.pdf; 
ROBERT B. JACKSON, ET AL., RESEARCH AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HYDRAULIC 
FRACTURING AND SHALE-GAS EXTRACTION (2011), available at http://nicholasinstitute. 
duke.edu/climate/policydesign/researchandpolicyrecommendationsforhydraulic-fracturin 
gandshale2010gasextraction. 
 13. See, e.g., ENERGY FUTURE COAL., CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITY: CHARTING A 
NEW ENERGY FUTURE (2003), available at http://www.energyfuturecoalition.org/files/ 
webfmuploads/EFC_Report/EFCReport.pdf; NAT’L COMM’N ON ENERGY POLICY, ENDING 
THE ENERGY STALEMATE: A BIPARTISAN STRATEGY TO MEET AMERICA’S ENERGY 
CHALLENGES (2004), available at http://www.bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/ 
endi_en_stlmate.pdf; 25X‘25 NAT’L STEERING COMM., 25X‘25 ACTION PLAN: CHARTING 
AMERICA’S ENERGY FUTURE (2007), available at http://www.25x25.org/storage/25x 
25/documents/IP%20Documents/Action_Plan/actionplan_64pg_11-11-07.pdf; NAT. 
RESOURCES DEF. COUNCIL, A RESPONSIBLE ENERGY PLAN FOR AMERICA (2005), available at 
http://physics .gac.edu/~huber/classes/FTS100/nrdc_report_2005.pdf. 
 14. For a more detailed and comprehensive description of clean energy policy, see 
TOMAIN, ENDING DIRTY ENERGY POLICY, supra note 4, at chs. 3–4. 
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I.  AN ANALYTIC MODEL FOR A CLEAN ENERGY POLICY 
We are all well aware that government regulation is ubiquitous in our 
lives.  The government regulates the labels on foods and drugs we 
consume, what we watch on TV or listen to on the radio, as well as 
the air we breathe and the water we drink.  We may be less aware of the 
fact that the government intervenes in private markets for only a limited 
number of reasons and that government has at its disposal only a limited 
number of regulatory tools to apply to perceived social and economic 
problems.16  Still, the range and pervasiveness of government regulation is 
as remarkable as it is contestable and contested.  Does the government 
regulate health care too much or too little?  Should the government 
impose more stringent controls on carbon emissions or let a less regulated 
market manage the environment?  What role, then, does the government 
play in adopting a clean energy platform and in rejecting its incumbent 
dirty energy past?  Any public policy, including clean energy, must pass 
through the gauntlet of the government approval process and to understand 
that gauntlet, we can apply an analytic model. 
This analytic model, or heuristic, is not as robust as the microeconomic 
model used by economists.  The microeconomic model is sturdy and has 
a good deal of predictive value.  If, for example, the price of gasoline at 
the pump rises and stays at $4 dollars a gallon, then we can predict with 
confidence that people will drive less and they will switch to more fuel-
efficient vehicles.  The model has other applications.  Most notably, it has 
been applied to political markets.  Some political scientists, for example 
positive political theorists and public or rational choice theorists, have 
adopted and applied the microeconomic model to politics in an attempt 
to explain legislative and bureaucratic behavior.17  At its most basic, the 
political science version of microeconomics roughly equates dollars with 
votes.  Under this rubric, politicians and bureaucrats use or refrain from 
 16. See SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, REGULATORY LAW AND POLICY (3rd 
ed. 2003). 
 17. See, e.g., DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III (2003); DANIEL A. FARBER & 
ANNE JOSEPH O’CONNELL, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 
(2010).  But see DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE 
THEORY: CRITIQUE OF APPLICATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE (1994); JERRY L. MASHAW, 
GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE IN IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW (1997). 
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using18 their legislative or regulatory authority to curry favor with political 
contributors and other actors for re-election or job advancement. 
Aside from that approach, other political scientists and government 
regulation theorists do not have a model of equal capability.  The 
political science version of the microeconomic model cannot, with as 
high a level of assurance, predict which political or policy initiatives are 
likely to emerge from the welter of social problems and concerns that 
confront us at any given time.  However, a lighter heuristic model does 
exist.  This model may not be able to predict which regulatory proposals 
will come forward, but it can predict which ones will fail.19  Simply, a 
regulatory proposal must satisfy three requirements before it becomes a 
law on the books.  Before a proposal is adopted as law it must satisfy 
constitutional and statutory law requirements; must be based on a policy 
analysis backed with reasonable empirical data; and, it must have sufficient 
political support.20  To be sure, those three requirements—law, policy 
and politics—are in themselves complicated and sometimes quite quixotic, 
especially the political leg of the stool.  Fortunately, in the clean energy 
space, two legs of the stool—law and policy—are sturdy and in place. 
A.  The Law of Clean Energy 
Energy law as a recognized legal discipline emanated from the energy 
crises of the 1970s.  Particularly in response to the OPEC Embargo of 
1973 and the ensuing inflation, Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter each 
addressed energy as a matter of national economic and security concern.21  
In one form or another, energy efforts were intended to promote our 
independence from Middle East oil, but all failed to achieve that 
independence.22  The failure was a double one. In the first instance, since 
the 1970s, our oil imports have only increased, from approximately 25% 
in 1970 to in excess of 60% today.23  In the second instance, all energy 
legislation for the last four decades has continued to promote a traditional 
 18.  See FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT EXTRACTION, 
AND POLITICAL EXTORTION (1997). 
 19. See, e.g., Joseph P. Tomain, Analyzing Government Regulation, 49 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 377 (1997). 
 20. See SHAPIRO  & TOMAIN, supra note 16. 
 21. ENERGY LAW GROUP, ENERGY LAW AND POLICY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY ch. 6 
(2000). 
 22. JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, ENDING DIRTY ENERGY POLICY, supra note 4, at ch. 1. 
 23. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 2009 128 (Aug. 2010), 
available at http://205.254.135.24/emeu/aer/pdf/aer.pdf. 
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fossil fuel energy policy with occasional nods to energy efficiency and 
to a greater use of renewable resources.24 
Even though energy law and policy may be seen as a reaction to the 
economic disruptions of the 1970’s, energy law had numerous antecedents, 
most particularly the regulation of public utilities such as natural gas and 
electricity.  The principals of public utility regulation, later termed the 
regulation of network industries,25 are significant.  Most particularly, public 
utility regulation was based upon the radical idea that in a capitalist 
democracy government can enter into private markets and set prices in 
those markets. 
Today, such an idea sets the teeth of libertarian Tea Partiers on a decided 
edge.  Yet, government price setting is a 19th-century idea based on two 
elements.  First, government can exercise price setting authority once the 
legislature has deemed that regulation of a service or product is “in the 
public interest.”26  Second, the particular industry that provides the good 
or service must be found to suffer a market imperfection such as natural 
monopoly.27  Notice that neither of these two elements are purely technical.  
Instead, even if we define “natural monopoly” in purely economic instead 
of political terms, then identifying what constitutes the “public interest” 
is essentially a political decision.  Economists contest the issue of whether a 
“natural monopoly” exists, or if it does exist, whether regulation is justified.28  
Thus, both elements needed to justify government price setting in private 
markets involve political considerations. 
Once regulation of prices is justified, then it is a relatively small step 
to regulate entry and exit into and out of energy markets, and to regulate 
the allocation of goods within those markets, especially in times of 
 24. Joseph P. Tomain, The Dominant Model of United States Energy Policy, 61 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 355 (1990); JOSEPH P. TOMAIN & RICHARD D. CUDAHY, ENERGY LAW IN A 
NUTSHELL ch. 2 (2d ed. 2011). 
 25.  See Joseph P. Tomain, networkindustries.gov.reg, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 829 (2000). 
 26. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 139–40 (1876). 
 27. Id. 
 28. See, e.g., THE END OF A NATURAL MONOPOLY: DEREGULATION AND COMPETITION 
IN THE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY (Peter Z. Grossman & Daniel H. Cole eds., 2003); 
Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 J.L. & ECON. 55 (1968).  Still, the prevailing 
authority is that natural monopolies do exist and that they justify regulation.  See, e.g., 
Omega Satellite Prods. Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 126 (7th Cir. 1982) 
(Posner, J.); ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND 
INSTITUTIONS (1st ed. 1991); STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982). 
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increased scarcity.29  Entry controls such as licenses; exit controls such 
as abandonment permits; and, allocation controls are all regulatory tools 
that have been applied to oil, natural gas, nuclear power, hydroelectricity, 
electricity and coal among other energy resources.  Consequently, the legal 
element for supporting a clean energy policy has been long and well 
accepted and it is amply discussed in a new publication, The Law of 
Clean Energy30 that surveys an extraordinarily wide range of local, state 
and national laws that directly regulate and promote clean energy initiatives. 
Still, legal questions will occur and legal issues will continue to be 
contested.  Because legal rules have been applied for over a century to 
an entrenched fossil-fuel based energy policy that has been adapted for 
traditional energy firms with their own corporate and industrial 
configurations, new entrants and new configurations will inevitably 
confront legal rules that have become encrusted by old ways.  Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission rules, for example, have been interpreted in 
a way to serve individual utilities and their customers and, today, a smart 
grid will require a different form of cost allocation that needs to be fully 
designed and adopted before investors will be confident that their 
expectations of returns are reasonable.31  Similarly, pre-emption or 
commerce clause rules may interfere with attempts to rationalize renewable 
portfolio standards across states and streamline permitting processes for 
solar and wind installations on public or tribal lands for new transmission 
lines so that renewable power projects can be connected to the grid.32 
B.  Consensus Clean Energy Policy 
The second leg of the model requires policy support for any regulatory 
proposal.  Because we are dealing, initially, with a legislative matter of 
general applicability that does not affect any particular protected class, 
the policy support for clean energy need only satisfy a standard of 
rationality.  The rationality standard, in turn, requires that a regulation be 
reasonably calculated to achieve the public interest end that is sought. 
 29. See William J. Novak, Law and Social Control of American Capitalism, 60 
EMORY L.J. 377, 399–404 (2010). 
 30.  THE LAW OF CLEAN ENERGY: EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABLES (Michael B. Gerrard 
ed., 2011). 
 31. See, e.g., Illinois Com. Comm’n v. FERC, 576 F.3d 470 (7th Cir. 2009); 
Piedmont Environment Council v. FERC, 558 F.3d 304 (4th Cir. 2009); Cal. Wilderness 
Coal. v. DOE, No. 08-71074 (9th Cir. Feb. 1, 2011). 
 32. See, e.g., Stephen C. Braverman, State Renewable Portfolio Standards and the 
Commerce Clause, 25 NAT. RES. ENVT. 15 (2011); Steve Ferrey, FIT in the USA: 
Constitutional Questions About State-Mandated Renewable Tariffs, 148 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 60 
(2010); Donald M. Clary, Commercial-Scale Renewable Energy Projects on Tribal 
Lands, 25 NAT. RES. & ENVT. 19 (2011). 
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Subsidies for solar power are reasonably likely to encourage the production 
of solar installations and equipment.  Therefore, a solar subsidy is 
reasonably related to the end of promoting this renewable resource to help 
protect the environment or to wean the country away from foreign oil as 
matters of public importance.  Rationality review of regulation, then, is not 
a particularly difficult standard to satisfy, yet it is a useful one nonetheless 
because it forces policy proponents to articulate their public policy 
objectives, the means for obtaining them, and the data supporting them. 
We must now ask whether or not there is adequate policy support for a 
clean or low-carbon energy policy.  This may seem like a fairly mundane 
question, nevertheless, it must be answered and proponents of clean 
energy must be able to justify a move away from the traditional path to 
an alternative model with sufficient data. There is more than ample support 
for clean energy policy.  In fact, policy analysts have been discussing 
this topic for over four decades.  Not only do policy analyses satisfy the 
legal requirement of rationality, these analyses have been remarkably 
consistent over the decades.33 
Four decades is a lengthy time for political action, and it is true that 
the policy analyses for clean energy have shown development.  It is also 
true that these analyses tend to converge quite significantly over that 
time.  Energy policy studies, similar to the development of the field of 
energy law, began in earnest in the 1970s.  During that time, the price of 
a barrel of oil quadrupled, leading to double digit inflation, the rationing 
of oil as consumers waited in lines at gas pumps, and led to remarkable 
and unsuccessful oil price and allocation controls.  The history of the period 
is also remarkable for its great flurry of energy legislation, especially during 
the Carter administration.34  President Carter’s National Energy Act35 
and Energy Security Act36 set the contours for the new discipline of energy 
law and policy.  This legislation created the cabinet level Department of 
Energy and attempted a comprehensive regulation of energy production, 
distribution and consumption. 
Both in response to this flurry of legislation and in response to concerns 
about future energy supplies and future economic disruptions, think 
 33. TOMAIN, ENDING DIRTY ENERGY POLICY, supra note 4, at chs. 3–4 (chapters 
discuss numerous policy studies dating back to the early 1970s through 2010). 
 34. See TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 24, at ch. 2. 
 35.  Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 
3117 (1978). 
 36.  Energy Security Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-294, 94 Stat. 611 (1980). 
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tanks37 and university research centers38 began publishing energy studies.  
The early energy studies of the 1970s and 1980s were based upon two 
predominant ideas.  First, energy independence and second, easily available 
energy were important for reasons of economic health and national 
security.  In short, these studies were committed to the traditional idea 
that there was a direct and positive correlation between energy production 
and economic growth.  Consequently, because of this perspective, these 
early energy studies were most concerned about increasing energy prices.  
High energy prices had led to high inflation and consumer dissatisfaction.39  
Indeed, high energy prices betrayed the unstated principle of U.S. energy 
policy—consumers were “entitled” to cheap, abundant, and reliable 
energy resources. 
The consumer (and producer) expectation of cheap energy, however, 
obscured the reality that cheap energy was also dirty energy.  In effect, it 
was U.S. policy that cheap, dirty energy was treated as a public good.  
Nonetheless, cheap energy was considered a necessary element of the 
economy and high prices, according to such analyses, posed an 
unacceptable economic threat.  The threat to the environment was barely 
acknowledged in these studies. 
As it turns out, these studies tended to over-predict high energy prices 
and in this regard their conclusions were off the mark.  After the 
international energy markets stabilized, oil and other resource prices fell 
well below the dire estimates.40  Still, the studies were sensitive to the 
country’s need to remove itself from Middle East oil and to develop 
substitutes, including the expanded use of nuclear power, for an independent 
energy economy.41 
The 1970s opened the field of energy law and policy. That decade also 
witnessed the creation of our nation’s most extensive environmental 
laws to protect air, land and water, and to monitor major federal actions 
that threatened the human environment.42  It has been, and to some degree 
 37. See generally ENERGY POLICY PROJECT OF THE FORD FOUND., A TIME TO CHOOSE: 
AMERICA’S ENERGY FUTURE (1974); KENNETH J. ARROW ET AL., ENERGY: THE NEXT TWENTY 
YEARS (1979); SAM H. SCHURR ET AL., ENERGY IN AMERICA’S FUTURE: THE CHOICES BEFORE 
US (1979). 
 38. See I.C. BUPP ET AL., ENERGY FUTURE: REPORT OF THE ENERGY PROJECT AT THE 
HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL (Robert Stobaugh & Daniel Yergin eds., 1979). 
 39. Sidney A. Shapiro & Joseph P. Tomain, Rethinking Reform of Electricity Markets, 
40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 497, 512–15 (2005). 
 40. See JULIAN L. SIMON & HERMAN KAHN, THE RESOURCEFUL EARTH: A RESPONSE TO 
‘GLOBAL 2000’ 3, 342, 350–51 (1984). 
 41. See PAUL L. JOSKOW, Energy Policies and Their Consequences After 25 Years, 
24 ENERGY J. 17 (2003). 
 42. See Jack Lewis, Looking Backward: A Historical Perspective on Environmental 
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continues to be, a curiosity in our public policy landscape that energy 
and the environment have been treated independently of each other for 
the most part.  There are historical, political, institutional and conceptual 
reasons for the distinction even though energy production, natural 
resources and the environment are directly intertwined with each other 
all along the fuel cycle. 
Briefly, the conceptual distinction between energy and the environment is 
based upon two distinct views of the world.  From the energy perspective, 
exploration and production are directly responsible for a growing and 
vibrant economy.  From an environmental perspective, resource protection 
and conservation are normative values of high priority.  Indeed, the 
conservation movement can trace itself easily back to Teddy Roosevelt’s 
creation of national parks and back further to his spiritual forebears, the 
Transcendentalists.43 
For decades, energy law and policy and environmental law and policy 
have simply talked past each other.  Energy lawyers and policy analysts 
speak the language of production and economy, while environmentalists 
focus on preservation and protection.  Energy lawyers and policy analysts 
tend to ignore the tragedy of the commons and environmentalists tend to 
ignore the economic costs of doing nothing and the lifestyle costs of 
limiting growth. 
A clean energy politics can better our understanding of the relationships 
between energy and the environment.  A clean energy politics can also 
fashion a policy in which energy and the environment share a common 
vocabulary and common metrics.  The beginning of this merger can be 
traced, in part, to the environmental movement with its concern for more 
benign uses of natural resources.  However, writers such as Amery 
Lovins44 and Herman Daly,45 who engaged in energy analysis on its own 
terms largely independent of the environment, set the stage on which 
energy advocates and environmental advocates could act together. 
 43. See, e.g., Jedediah Purdy, The Politics of Nature: Climate Change, Environmental 
Law, and Democracy, 119 YALE L.J. 1122, 1139 (2010). 
 44. See generally AMORY B. LOVINS, SOFT ENERGY PATHS: TOWARD A DURABLE 
PEACE (1977); AMORY B. LOVINS & JOHN H. PRICE, NON-NUCLEAR FUTURES: THE CASE 
FOR AN ETHICAL ENERGY STRATEGY (1975); AMORY B. LOVINS & L. HUNTER LOVINS, 
BRITTLE POWER: ENERGY STRATEGY FOR NATIONAL SECURITY (1982); Amory B. Lovins, 
Energy Strategy: The Road Not Taken, 55 FOREIGN AFFS. 64 (Oct. 1976). 
 45.  Herman E. Daly, Economics in a Full World, 293 SCI. AM. 3 (Sept. 2005). 
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Lovins, Daly, and others,46 in the tradition of E.F. Schumacher’s Small 
is Beautiful,47 argued strenuously that the key myth to debunk was that 
energy production and economic growth were inexorably tied together 
and that growth in the energy sector was the sine qua non for economic 
growth.  If, for example, it could be shown that economic growth can 
continue with less energy consumption, then the myth is busted.  Indeed, 
since the mid-1970s U.S. energy intensity has declined noticeably.48  And, 
world energy intensity is also predicted to decline.49  A developed country, 
such as the United States, can reduce its energy consumption while 
increasing its economic productivity.  Exhibit A for that proposition is 
the state of California, which has leveled its electricity consumption 
while increasing its population and economic growth since 1970.50 
In the 1970s and early 1980s, energy and environmental studies 
continued to stay within the mindsets and vocabularies of their own 
disciplines.  As a consequence, energy and environmental laws remained 
uncoordinated and were administered by separate government agencies 
with little crossover between the two.  Separate governance continues to 
this day, yet policy analysts over the last decade have begun to bridge 
the gap between energy and environment, recognizing the inevitable 
consequences of an energy policy that ignores the social costs of fossil 
fuels. 
There has been an explosion of policy analyses addressing clean energy 
from multiple precincts within the last decade.  University-based institutes 
and research centers, newly created non-governmental organizations 
(“NGO”) and independent think tanks,51 as well as traditional trade 
associations and interest groups regularly publish clean energy studies 
that evince the beginning of a serious dialogue between energy and the 
environment.  The central concept in this new generation of energy analyses 
 46.  See, e.g., MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LAW, 
AND THE ENVIRONMENT (Douglas MacLean ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988). 
 47. See generally E. F. SCHUMACHER, SMALL IS BEAUTIFUL: ECONOMICS AS IF PEOPLE 
MATTERED (1973).  Schumacher’s influence has led to the creation of an economic think 
tank—The New Economics Institute, see http://neweconomicsinstitute.org/. 
 48. See ALAN J. KRUPNICK ET AL., TOWARD A NEW NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY: 
ASSESSING THE OPTIONS 11 (Nov. 2010), available at http://www.rff.org/Documents 
/RFF-Rpt-NEPI%20Tech%20Manual_Final.pdf; see also Annual Energy Review 
2009, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. xiii (Aug. 2010), available at http://www.eia.gov/ 
totalenergy/data/annual/pdf/aer.pdf 
 49. INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2010 81 (2010). 
 50. CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, CALIFORNIA LONG TERM ENERGY EFFICIENCY 
STRATEGIC PLAN: ACHIEVING MAXIMUM ENERGY SAVINGS IN CALIFORNIA FOR 2009 AND 
BEYOND (Sept. 2008), available at http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/NR/rdonlyres/D4321448-
208C-48F9-9F62-1BBB14A8D717/0/EEStrategicPlan.pdf. 
 51. See, e.g., ENERGY POLICY PROJECT OF THE FORD FOUND., supra note 37; KENNETH 
J. ARROW ET AL., supra note 37; SAM H. SCHURR ET AL., supra note 37. 
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is that any discussion of future energy policy cannot focus solely on the 
relationship between energy and the economy.  Energy, of course, is and 
will always be a primary input into the economy.  Nevertheless, the 
linkage between energy production and economic growth is no longer as 
direct or costless as it was once believed.  Indeed, the entire concept of 
energy efficiency is based upon the idea that we can use less energy or 
use energy more intelligently while not sacrificing our economic health. 
Current energy studies, like those of a generation ago, continue to 
discuss the need for energy independence or, perhaps more accurately, 
independence from Middle Eastern oil.  These studies approach discussion 
of oil independence in terms of both national security as well as 
economic security.  From a national security perspective, continued 
reliance on oil imports from an unstable Middle East poses not only 
security threats to our country but imposes substantial national security 
costs as well.52  From an economic security perspective, volatile prices 
make investments in the energy sector financially risky as our country’s 
flirtation with synfuels in the late 1970s and early 1980s demonstrated.53  
Dependence on imported oil thus threatens economic security because 
prices are unstable, subject to manipulation by the oil cartel, and disrupt 
economic planning.  Finally, these new policy studies are acutely aware 
of the challenges posed by global warming and climate change.  In brief, 
these new energy policy studies address security and the environment as 
well as energy and the economy.  Because of these four variables—
energy, economy, environment, and security—the new energy studies 
focus on clean energy as distinguished from fossil fuels.  Clean energy 
policy, then, shifts its focus from fossil fuels to energy efficiency and 
renewable resources as necessary elements for a healthy future economy. 
 52. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER BEDDOR ET AL., SECURING AMERICA’S FUTURE: ENHANCING 
OUR NATIONAL SECURITY BY REDUCING OIL DEPENDENCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE 
1–2 (Aug. 2009), available at http://www.americanprogress. org/issues/2009/08/pdf/energy_ 
security.pdf; GEORGE E. PATAKI & THOMAS J. VILSACK, CONFRONTING CLIMATE CHANGE: A 
STRATEGY FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (2008), available at http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/ 
attachments/Climate_ChangeTF.pdf; CNA MIL. ADVISORY BD., POWERING AMERICA’S 
DEFENSE: ENERGY AND THE RISKS TO NATIONAL SECURITY (May 2009), available at 
http://www.cna.org/documents/Powering AmericasDefense.pdf; CNA MIL. ADVISORY 
BD., POWERING AMERICA’S ECONOMY: ENERGY INNOVATION AT THE CROSSROADS OF 
NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES (July 2010), available at http://www.cna.org/sites/ 
default/files/research/WEB%2007%2027%2010%20MAB%20Powering%20America%27s 
%20Economy.pdf. 
 53.  See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, THE END OF ENERGY:  THE UNMAKING OF AMERICA’S 
ENVIRONMENT, SECURITY, AND INDEPENDENCE 92–95 (2011). 
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C.  The Political Challenge 
Clean energy policy, then, has ample legal and policy support for going 
forward.  Clean energy policy, however, faces a substantial political 
challenge.  In part, that challenge can be met with a more finely tuned 
message about a smart energy future, discussed below.  Above, the lack 
of congressional leadership on clean energy has been noted.  This lack, 
however, does not end the story about clean energy politics.  Rather, the 
political focus must lie elsewhere and it does. 
President Obama has consistently advocated a clean energy future.  He 
assembled a “green energy dream team” in the White House and in his 
administration; his annual budgets to Congress show increased support 
for clean energy initiatives and decreasing support for fossil fuel subsidies, 
while regularly advocating for increased clean energy innovation research 
and design (“R&D”) funding.54  One branch of government, of course, can 
only go so far, yet President Obama has begun to execute an energy 
transition to a clean energy economy more than any president before 
him. 
The real politics of clean energy are being acted out in other precincts.  
By way of example, the new generation of energy reports discussed 
above is decidedly non-partisan and those reports have been animated 
and published by a wide variety of research centers and NGOs.55  Perhaps 
even more impressive has been the willingness of private sector actors to 
fund clean energy activities.  Over the last few years, domestic and global 
clean energy funding has expanded more than any other investment sector.  
Select venture capitalists concentrate on clean energy and climate change 
initiatives.  Commercial and investment banks have set up clean energy, 
climate change and carbon emissions investment desks.  In a complementary 
way, public sector innovation funding is increasing, with the specific goal of 
bringing clean energy technology innovations to commercial scale.  From 
the public sector, clean energy programs are taking place in the states, 
again most notably in California,56 in the cities, and in efforts such as the 
regional greenhouse gas initiative in the Northeast57 and in the Midwest 
 54. Tomain, Our Generation’s Sputnik Moment, supra note 2, at 389. 
 55. See, e.g., ENERGY FUTURE COAL., http://www.energyfuturecoalition.org/; 
National Commission on Energy Policy, BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR., http://bipartisan policy. 
org/projects/national-commission-energy-policy; see also Timothy E. Wirth, C. Boyden 
Gray & John D. Podesta, The Future of Energy Policy, 82 FOREIGN AFFS. 132 (July/Aug. 
2003). 
 56.  See, e.g., CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, http://www.energy.ca.gov/ (last updated Jan. 27, 
2012); EFFICIENCY VT., http://www.efficiencyvermont.com/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2011). 
 57. See REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, http://www.rggi.org/home (last 
visited Dec. 20, 2011); see also Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, PEW CTR. ON 
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climate change program as well.58  Here, it is important to note that even 
though Washington leadership on Capitol Hill is decidedly absent, a 
vibrant clean energy politics exists and thrives elsewhere. 
The political landscape for a clean energy politics is under active 
development.  Certainly, national leadership from Washington is highly 
desirable and that leadership can be best manifested by legislation that 
sets a price on carbon.  A well-constructed carbon price, i.e. a price that 
fully accounts for the cost of carbon externalities, would begin to level 
the playing field for clean energy market actors.  Nevertheless, even without 
that price, the contours of the developing clean energy politics are coming 
into clearer view. 
A robust clean energy politics must, at a minimum, address the 
following issues.  First, what options are available for pricing carbon?  
Second, as a society, we must recognize that clean energy, like climate 
change, is a categorically different type of regulatory problem necessitating 
categorically different regulatory solutions.  Third, moving away from a 
century-old fossil fuel policy is challenging—a policy with which all of 
us, consumers and producers alike, have grown quite comfortable.  What 
lifestyle changes, then, will result from switching industries?  Fourth, 
what is the political “message” for clean energy?  Finally, who are the 
likely foot soldiers to carry the message?  These are the political issues 
to which we now turn. 
II.  BACKGROUND CONDITIONS 
The most fundamental and basic argument for clean energy politics is 
that the focus should remain on efficiency and non-fossil fuel resources 
instead of attending to the complications involved with global warming 
or climate change.  Indeed, even choosing the proper label—climate change 
or global warming—is contentious in itself as well as in the 
environmental community.  While it is true that energy and the 
environment are directly connected and that a clean energy politics is 
complementary to climate change, there are differences between the two 
that are noteworthy, can inform the public discussion and may become 
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE,  available at http://www.pewclimate.org/what_s_being_done 
/in_the_states/rggi (last visited Dec. 20, 2011). 
 58. See Midwest Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord, PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL 
CLIMATE CHANGE, available at http://www.pewclimate.org/what_s_being_done/in_the_ 
states/mggra (last visited Dec. 20, 2011). 
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contentious.  By way of example, clean energy advocates prefer to 
streamline the federal permitting of wind and solar projects on public 
lands, which challenges the interests of environmentalists that seek to 
protect those lands as well as to guard against environmental harms 
involved in the construction of these renewable resources projects.59 
A.  Conceptual Difficulties 
Clean energy and climate change, however, share a very deep and 
important commonality.  Both issues are categorically different from the 
routine sort of regulatory problems that governments have confronted in 
the past.  When the modern activist state began in the late 19th and early 
20th centuries, a pattern for government regulation was established.  Our 
government is quite content to let competitive markets serve as a force 
for social ordering by which is meant the production, distribution and 
consumption of goods and services throughout society as widely as 
possible.  Through the give-and-take of the marketplace, both consumer 
and producer surplus is maximized in competitive markets.  By the mid- 
to late 19th century, however, it was clear that industrialized economies 
could distort markets for any number of reasons.  Oil, grain, and rail 
cartels exhibited monopoly power and thus constrained consumer choice 
while creating producer rents.  Similarly, the failure of drug and 
pharmaceutical industries to police themselves and allow tainted products 
onto the market serve as other examples of market failure.  In response 
to these market failures, government regulation is justified.  The central 
point is that government reacts to problems ex post rather than 
anticipates them ex ante. 
Another characteristic of traditional government regulation is that 
problems such as a monopoly in an industry, or asymmetrical information, 
or unsafe and dangerous products are all fairly discrete problems that, 
with a well-crafted regulation, can be fixed.  This type of retrospective 
government regulation can even go beyond discrete problems in specific 
industries and can address economy-wide problems.  Government 
regulation during the New Deal did shore up failing financial markets 
through securities regulation, protected the middle class through Social 
Security and contributed to building a national energy infrastructure 
through oil pipeline, natural gas pipeline and electricity transmission 
 59. The argument against using public lands for clean energy projects can also be 
manipulated by anti-green interest groups.  See Robert Bryce, The Gas Is Greener, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 8, 2010, at A21. 
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regulations.60  Traditional regulation, then, is best characterized as 
retrospective and discrete. 
Neither clean energy nor climate change can be considered discrete in 
the sense just described.  The contours of both are complex and multi-
layered.  Indeed, complexity and uncertainty are the hallmarks of each 
problem, although less so for clean energy.  Climate change, to begin 
with, has an established science relative to understanding that the planet 
is warming.  There is also a strong scientific consensus that there is a 
human contribution to that warming because of the burning of fossil 
fuels.61  There is less scientific consensus, however, about the exact 
relationship between the build-up of greenhouse gases and the rate of 
temperature increase.  Further, even assuming that policymakers can 
establish specific benchmarks, such as limiting the amount of carbon 
dioxide in the atmosphere or preventing or limiting warming to a certain 
degree, the technical means for doing so are open for discussion.62  
Moreover, the calculation of costs and benefits for reducing global warming 
 60. See, e.g., ALAN BRINKLEY, THE END OF REFORM: NEW DEAL LIBERALISM IN 
RECESSION AND WAR (1995); see also TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 24, at ch. 2. 
 61. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, FOURTH ASSESSMENT 
REPORT: SYNTHESIS FOR POLICYMAKERS 5 (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/ 
assessment–report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr_spm.pdf; NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, ADVANCING THE SCIENCE 
OF CLIMATE CHANGE (2010); JASON FURMAN, ET AL., AN ECONOMIC STRATEGY TO 
ADDRESS CLIMATE CHANGE AND PROMOTE ENERGY SECURITY (Oct. 2007), available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2007/10climatechange_furman/10_cli
matechange_furman.pdf; RICK DUKE & DAN LASHOF, THE NEW ENERGY ECONOMY: 
PUTTING AMERICA ON THE PATH TO SOLVING GLOBAL WARMING 5 (June 2008), available at 
http://www.nrdc.org/globalWarming/energy/eeconomy.pdf; see also RACHEL CLEETUS, 
STEVEN CLEMMER & DAVID FRIEDMAN, CLIMATE 2030: A NATIONAL BLUEPRINT FOR A 
CLEAN ENERGY ECONOMY 6 (May 2009), available at http://www.ucsusa.org/global 
_warming/solutions/big_picture_solutions/climate-2030-blueprint.html. 
 62. For a report favoring 450 ppm carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, see U.S. 
CLIMATE ACTION P’SHIP, A CALL FOR ACTION: CONSENSUS PRINCIPLES AND 
RECOMMENDATION FROM THE U. S. CLIMATE ACTION PARTNERSHIP: A BUSINESS AND 
NGO PARTNERSHIP (2007), available at http://www.us–cap.org/about–us/our–report–a–
call–for–action/.  For reports favoring 350 ppm, see FRANK ACKERMAN ET AL., THE 
ECONOMICS OF 350: THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF CLIMATE STABILIZATION 13 (Oct. 
2009), available at http://www.e3network.org/papers/Economics_of_350.pdf; JAMES 
HANSEN ET AL., TARGET ATMOSPHERIC CO2: WHERE SHOULD HUMANITY AIM? (2008), 
available at http://www.columbia.edu/~jeh1/2008/TargetCO2 _20080407.pdf (350 ppm as 
the safe level); NICHOLAS STERN, A BLUEPRINT OF A SAFER PLANET: HOW TO MANAGE 
CLIMATE CHANGE AND CREATE A NEW ERA OF PROGRESS AND PROSPERITY 39 (2009) 
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are highly contentious.63  In short, climate change is imbued with scientific, 
technical, and economic uncertainty and complexity.  To further complicate 
matters, climate change is multi-generational, multi-jurisdictional, and 
trans-boundary.  Climate change is a global problem that will outlast all 
of us. 
Because of the magnitude of the climate change challenge, it is not 
unusual for policy makers, politicians and ordinary citizens to resist 
confronting the problem because it is beyond their ability to understand 
and address it.  Lord Anthony Giddens refers to this phenomenon as 
Giddens paradox: 
It states that, since the dangers posed by cool warming aren’t tangible, 
immediate or visible in the course of day-to-day life, however awesome they 
appear, many will sit on their hands and do nothing of a concrete nature about 
them.  Yet waiting until they become visible and acute before being stirred to 
serious action will, by definition, be too late.64 
Giddens Paradox captures the idea of future discounting.  It is an 
ordinary psychological phenomenon that individuals prefer to think about 
today rather than tomorrow, particularly a tomorrow many years in the 
future because of the difficulty of evaluating the future.  Climate change 
is more likely to affect our grandchildren than it is likely to affect us.  
Carbon dioxide released into the atmosphere today cannot be measured 
for 30 years as an example.65 
Clean energy shares many of these issues but not to the same degree.  
Thus, assuming that clean energy is a desirable path forward regardless 
of climate change, numerous technical and economic uncertainties and 
complexities must be confronted.  Perhaps the most significant problem 
that faces clean energy is the existence of an incumbent fossil fuel 
industry that has sunk billions of dollars in capital expenditures.  
These expenditures have political as well as economic consequences.  
The politics of dirty energy is well entrenched in U.S. law and institutions 
and dirty energy advocates have successfully prevented Congress from 
 63. More specifically, the partisans in the cost-benefit debate over climate change 
have significantly different estimate of costs and benefits depending on which, if any, 
discount rate is used.  See, e.g., NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: 
THE STERN REVIEW 3 (2007) (using a discount rate of 1.4%); WILLIAM NORDHAUS, 
THE STERN REVIEW ON THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE (Nov. 17, 2006) (5%); 
MARTIN L. WEITZMAN, THE STERN REVIEW OF THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
(Apr. 31, 2007) (6%); see also Kenneth J. Arrow, Global Climate Change: A Challenge to 
Policy, ECONOMISTS’ VOICE (June 2007); Symposium, Intergenerational Equity and 
Discounting, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2007). 
 64. GIDDENS, supra note 6, at 2. 
 65. See, e.g., MCKIBBEN, supra note 15, at ch. 1; Kelly S. Gallagher, Acting in 
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acting.  Clean energy advocates, then, must not only justify a new energy 
policy, they must confront an incumbent one.  The proper justification 
can occur by arguing that a clean energy future is economically desirable 
and valuable.  Still, the devil in the details involves which clean technologies 
can be made commercially available, when they can be made available 
and at what cost. 
Thus, while clean energy and climate change contain complexities and 
uncertainties along numerous dimensions, clean energy is something that 
we can address now.  Clean energy does not embody Giddens Paradox 
in the way that the paradox applies to inaction over climate change.  
Individuals can use compact fluorescent light bulbs, recycle, purchase 
electric or hybrid vehicles, monitor their consumption of electricity and 
politically support the greater use of renewable resources such as wind 
and solar.  In other words, a clean energy politics can transform government 
policy and can transform the way we live today, rather than wait a 
generation or two. 
B.  Pricing Carbon 
Clean energy and climate change programs would both benefit from a 
nationally set carbon price.66  Indeed, advocates from both camps 
recognize the central importance of a price on carbon for advancing both 
agendas.  Unfortunately, these same groups recognize the unlikelihood 
of Congressional leadership on this issue.  Nevertheless, a brief primer 
on the four basic methods for pricing carbon is instructive.  As for the 
four methods, two rely on economic or financial indicators and two rely 
on standard setting as regulatory options. 
Economists generally agree that the simplest and most straightforward 
method to price carbon is a carbon tax.  Known as a Pigovian tax, named 
after the English economist, A.C. Pigou, it is imposed on activities, such 
as greenhouse gas emissions, which generate negative externalities.  By 
imposing a tax, the price of that activity can rise to the point at which 
consumption diminishes to a desired level or abatement measures are 
 66. See, e.g., NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, AMERICA’S CLIMATE CHOICES 3 (2011), available 
at http://americasclimatechoices.org/ACC_Final_Report_Key_Findings.pdf; see also 
MICHAEL GREEENSTONE & ADAM LOONEY, A STRATEGY FOR AMERICA’S ENERGY 
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taken to reduce the impact of the negative externalities.  The trick is to 
set the optimum tax rate. 
In the context of clean energy policy, a tax would be imposed on 
gasoline, coal burning and other fossil fuel activities that generate 
greenhouse gas emissions.  Taxes are simple to design and administer, 
and they have the advantage of signaling a price to the market.  A tax, 
however, does not set a limit on emissions.  Clearly, the tax would raise 
the price of certain products to consumers, which makes this approach 
wildly unpopular.  On one hand, higher taxes reduce the consumption of 
fossil fuels and reduce carbon emissions.  On the other hand, higher 
consumer prices are politically unattractive, most often regressive and 
can have an inflationary impact.  A carbon tax policy, however, can be 
designed to help ameliorate some of the regressive effects that tax will 
have on lower income consumers through tax credits, rebates or the like.  
A carbon tax also generates revenues that can be shifted back to consumers 
or invested in a clean energy transition or both.67 
As simple and as directed as a carbon tax is, difficult issues must be 
addressed.  What should the tax rate be?  Theoretically, the tax should 
equal the marginal cost of the pollution, which is also known as the social 
cost of carbon.  Experts, however, disagree on what that cost actually 
is.68  Additionally, how much greenhouse gas reduction can be achieved?  
How should revenues be treated?  Should revenues be dedicated to public 
purposes such as clean energy?  Should they be used for tax reductions? 
A cap-and-trade regime is a more complicated economic regulation 
but it has broader political support.69  Like a tax, a cap-and-trade program is 
intended to raise the price of fossil fuels.  Unlike a tax, though, cap-and-
trade sets emissions limits but does not set a price and does not necessarily 
raise revenue.  Instead, it is intended to be a more market-oriented 
 67.  See, e.g., GRAETZ, supra note 53, at 180–81. 
 68.  Compare Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon, Appendix 
15A. Social Cost of Carbon for Regulatory Impact Analysis Under Executive Order 
12866, DOE (2010), available at http://www1.eere.energy.gov/buildings/appliance_ 
standards/commercial/pdfs/sem_finalrule_appendix15a.pdf ($21 per ton of carbon dioxide) 
with Frank Ackerman & Elizabeth A. Stanton, The Social Cost of Carbon, ECON. 
FOR EQUITY AND THE ENV’T (Apr. 1, 2010), available at http://www.e3network.org/ 
papers/SocialCostOfCarbon_SEI_20100401.pdf. ($21 per ton too low, UK government 
estimation ranges from $41 to $124 per ton). 
 69. Compare Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & David M. Uhlmann, Combating Global Climate 
Change: Why a Carbon Tax is a Better Response to Global Warming than Cap and Trade, 28 
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3 (2009) with RICHARD G. HILDRETH ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE LAW: 
MITIGATION AND ADAPTATION 506–56 (2009); William D. Nordhaus, Yale Univ. Sterling 
Professor of Econ., Keynote Address at the Climate Change: Global Risks, Challenges, 
and Decisions Conference, Economic Issues in Designing a Global Agreement on Global 
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regulatory scheme.  The regulator must determine a level of emissions of 
any particular pollutant that will be allowed. Carbon dioxide, for example, 
would have an allowable limit.  Carbon dioxide emitters would then be 
required to have permits allowing them to emit to the allowable level.  A 
firm, such as a public utility that cannot achieve its allowable limit would 
then be required to purchase tradable permits in a carbon emissions market. 
A cap-and-trade scheme requires the regulator to set an emissions limit 
and to monitor that limit to determine its effectiveness.  Additionally, the 
regulator must determine whether or not the emissions market is 
functioning as desired and that prices are regularly calibrated to achieve 
the desired emissions reductions.  Further, decisions must be made 
concerning who is required to use the permits, who is entitled to offsets, 
and who monitors the markets. 
Instead of financial indicators, government regulators can use standards 
as regulatory tools.  The basic form of a regulatory standard would 
be simply to set a limit on greenhouse gas emissions.  A firm, for example, 
would be prohibited from emitting more than a set level of carbon 
dioxide.  In this way, the firm will then have to take measures, such as 
install pollution control technologies, to reduce those emissions.  Thus, 
an emissions standard can be seen as technology-forcing.  The major 
drawback of this approach is that is that a firm can go out of business 
because it may be unable to reduce emissions in satisfaction of the 
standard.  A cap-and-trade approach gives a firm more flexibility because it 
allows it to trade in an emissions market to meet the standard.  This 
approach also gives a firm more flexibility in choosing or not choosing 
to use pollution control technologies. 
Finally, a clean energy standard has been proposed that limits the 
volume of carbon dioxide that can be generated by a utility.  Public 
utilities currently emit 0.56 tons of carbon dioxide per megawatt hour of 
electricity generation.  A clean energy performance goal would be to reduce 
carbon emissions to 0.4 tons per megawatt hour by 2015 with a further 
reduction to 0.2 tons per megawatt hour by 2035.  By imposing such 
performance goals, a clean energy standard is neutral regarding technology, 
is easier to administer, and can smooth out the amalgam of renewable 
portfolio standards now in existence in over 30 states.  The standard can 
also be designed to provide for clean energy credits for those firms that 
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exceed the goal and those credits could be sold in an emissions market 
similar to a cap-and-trade market.70 
These market regulations and regulatory standards are all intended to 
price carbon for the express purpose of reducing greenhouse gas pollutants.  
Each scheme has different attributes.  Yet, all will raise the price of carbon 
emissions to some extent and all should have the effect of reducing fossil 
fuel consumption and promoting clean energy alternatives.  Some schemes 
will have greater opportunities for raising revenue than others.  Further, 
each has a different degree of administrative complexity.  What all of these 
schemes do share, however, is that they should be federally imposed 
in order to have a significant impact and to have a chance of success. 
Unfortunately, what all of these schemes have in common is that the 
federal government will not step in to directly price carbon either through 
financial or market-based regulations or through command-and-control 
type standards.  As policy thinkers, this impasse presents a choice: retreat or 
take another tack?  Markets abhor vacuums.  Therefore, market actors 
will not sit idly by waiting for the Washington impasse to clear.  Instead, 
a clean energy politics is emerging that will make its business and policy 
case on its own, unfettered to climate change initiatives.  Certainly, climate 
change advocates and environmentalist are desirable partners for coalition 
building.  Nevertheless, today clean energy policy has a strong case that 
is easier to craft and implement than a national climate change mitigation 
policy. 
III.  DESIGNING A CLEAN ENERGY POLITICS 
From the beginning of the modern environmental movement and from 
the time of our growing concerns about energy in the 1970s, energy policy 
and environmental policy have traveled fairly distinct paths.  Clean energy 
politics pays more attention to environmental policy than the traditional 
energy path has done and yet a distinction remains between energy and 
the environment.  Not surprisingly, environmental advocates tend to be 
sensitive to and protective of environmental threats posed by energy 
projects whether they are solar farms on public lands or traditional 
oil pipelines.71  Similarly, energy advocates tout our economic need for 
energy and particularly our need for energy independence. 
 70. See Joseph E. Aldy, Promoting Clean Energy in the American Power Sector, 
BROOKINGS INST. (May 2011), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/ 
papers/2011/05_clean_energy_aldy/05_clean_energy_aldy_paper.pdf. 
 71. See, e.g., Ian Austen, Canada Prepares Plans B and C in Case Oil Sands 
Pipeline Hits a Roadblock, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2011, at B10 (The proposed Keystone 
XL pipeline is intended to transport shale oil from Alberta Canada to the Gulf of Mexico.  
Most of the pipeline from Canada is already constructed and ends in Cushing, 
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Consequently, although clean energy and climate change are directly 
connected, they remain distinct concepts in public discourse and in public 
opinion.  This continuing division between energy and the environment 
should send a strong signal for those who wish to craft politics of clean 
energy.  Indeed, the most powerful political message that can be given 
by clean energy advocates is to demonstrate that clean energy initiatives, 
while consistent with responsible environmental stewardship, are important 
independent objectives.  The message continues that the construction of 
a new energy economy built on energy efficiency and renewable resources 
is the best public policy path forward. 
A.  Clean Energy and Public Opinion 
Public opinion polls show a continuing division among the American 
public between their beliefs about clean energy and their beliefs about 
climate change.  Polls demonstrate that more Americans believe that the 
country’s and the world’s environments are worsening.  Yet, going 
behind the numbers, there is a deep split along political party and 
ideological lines.  A majority of Democrats believe that climate change 
is occurring and believe it is caused by human behavior.  Republicans 
believe exactly the opposite with less than 20% believing that climate 
change is occurring and approximately 20% believing that it is caused 
by human behavior.72  The 2010 midterm election made conversation 
even more difficult, with half of the new incoming House Republicans 
denying that there is reliable science behind global warming.  Indeed, 
climate denial is an article of political faith.73  Republican Representative 
and Congressional Tea Party Caucus founder Michelle Bachmann is of 
the opinion that global warming science is hooey and that “[c]arbon is 
natural, it is not harmful.  It is part of Earth’s life cycle” and that to 
Oklahoma.  The remaining stretch of the pipeline to the Gulf of Mexico is under review 
and environmentalists contest the construction of this pipeline largely because of 
opposition to shale oil, which consumes significant quantities of water and affects the 
local environment); see, e.g., Susan Casey-Lefkowitz, Keystone XL Tar Sands Pipeline 
Environmental Review—Strike Two!, NRDC (Apr. 19, 2011), available at http:// 
switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/sclefkowitz/keystone_xl_tar_sands_pipeline.html. 
 72. The Word Doctors, The Language of a Clean Energy Economy, NEWS CORP. 
(2010), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/hepg/Papers/2010/Luntzpreso.pdf. 
 73. Editorial, Try Something Hard: Governing, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2010, at 
WK7, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/14/opinion/14sun1.html. 
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reduce carbon dioxide will “reduce the American standard of living. . .”74  
Remarks such as these are fodder for the conservative faithful. 
When the conversation turns to energy, though, there is a firm consensus 
about the need for a new energy policy.  In a June 2010 New York 
Times poll, 89% said that fundamental changes are needed in U.S. energy 
policy and 61% said that alternatives to oil should be developed with 
twenty-five years.75 
Aside from the partisan divide, public opinion remains unsettled and 
conflicted about the relationship between energy and the environment.  
In a 2008 poll, for example, more than 90% of Americans believe that 
the United States should act to reduce global warming even if it had 
economic costs.76  Yet, in 2010 polls conducted by the same organizations, 
opinion had shifted.  In November 2008, over 70% of those polled believed 
that global warming was occurring, and in June 2010 only 61% believed 
it to be the case.  Similarly, there has been a decline in public opinion 
regarding the belief that global warming is occurring as a result of human 
action; fewer people are worried about global warming; and more people 
believe, against the evidence, that there is disagreement among scientists 
regarding global warming.77  Americans see global warming as a less 
significant priority in 2010 than they did in 2008. 
Public opinion, though, is increasing that clean energy should be a 
high priority on the American agenda.  Polls indicate notable support for 
funding renewable energy research, for tax rebates for efficient cars and 
solar panels, for regulation of carbon dioxide and for increasing building 
efficiency.  A public consensus exists that energy policy should promote 
energy efficiency, create jobs and new energy sources, and protect national 
security as reasons to adopt cap-and-trade regulations.78  A recent PEW 
poll indicates that 63% of Americans are in favor of developing clean 
energy resources with 29% preferring the continued development of oil, 
natural gas and coal, although that preference also divides along liberal 
 74.  Joan R. Neubaur, Bachman Promises to Eliminate the EPA, HULIQ (June 14, 
2011), available at http://www.huliq.com/10280/bachman-promises-eliminate-epa. 
 75. John M. Broder & Marjorie Connelly, Even on Gulf Coast, Energy and Economy 
Surpass Spill Concerns, Poll Finds, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2010, at A16. 
 76. YALE PROJECT ON CLIMATE CHANGE & GEORGE MASON UNIV. CTR. FOR CLIMATE 
CHANGE COMMC’N, CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE AMERICAN MIND: AMERICANS’ CLIMATE 
CHANGE BELIEFS, ATTITUDES, POLICY PREFERENCES, AND ACTIONS 14–15 (Mar. 2009), 
available at http://www.climatechangecommunication.org/images/files/Climate_Chan ge_in_ 
the_American_Mind.pdf. 
 77. YALE PROJECT ON CLIMATE CHANGE & GEORGE MASON UNIV. CTR. FOR 
CLIMATE CHANGE COMMC’N, CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE AMERICAN MIND: AMERICANS’ 
GLOBAL WARMING ATTITUDES AND BELIEFS IN JUNE 2010 (June 2010), available at http:// 
www.climatechangecommunication.org/images/files/ClimateBeliefsJune2010(1).pdf 
[hereinafter YALE PROJECT 2010]. 
 78. Jon A. Krosnick, The Climate Majority, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2010, at A21. 
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and conservative lines.  Liberals favor clean energy and believe in 
climate change while conservatives prefer to “Drill, Baby, Drill” and deny 
global warming.79  At the same time, Americans support offshore drilling 
and nuclear power.80  The tension between the hard and soft energy paths 
continues. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the levels of knowledge concerning climate 
change and responses to it vary across the population.  While no single 
group scores particularly high in understanding climate change and 
possible solutions, Americans who are concerned and express a belief in 
climate change tend to have more knowledge than those that deny its 
existence.81 
This conflict between climate change skepticism and growing support 
for clean energy is both instructive and historic.  The conflict indicates 
that whereas public opinion is more comfortable with the language of 
clean energy, there remains a need for a broad political and economic 
conversation with a new language and a new vocabulary about a future 
energy policy that incorporates environmental concerns.  Still, energy 
advocates and environmental advocates continue to talk past one another 
and that disconnection is continuing as the polling data discussed 
previously indicate.82 
The lessons to be learned from this polling are clear and direct and, 
have in fact, been applied.  In the 2010 elections in California, an 
initiative known as Proposition 23, was on the ballot which was aimed at 
voiding the previously enacted bill, the Global Warming Act of 2006.  
Proposition 23 supporters were well financed by anti-tax advocates and 
energy firms.  The supporters argued that the state’s Global Warming 
Act would be a job killer and would raise energy prices.  Opponents of 
Proposition 23, in part under the leadership of former Republican 
Secretary of State George Schultz, argued that Proposition 23 should 
 79.  PEW RESEARCH CTR., BEYOND RED VS. BLUE: POLITICAL TYPOLOGY 7, 83–85 
(May 4, 2011), available at http://people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/Beyond-Red-vs-Blue- 
The-Political-Typology.pdf. 
 80. YALE PROJECT 2010, supra note 77, at 7. 
 81. ANTHONY LEISEROWITZ & NICHOLAS SMITH, YALE UNIV., KNOWLEDGE OF CLIMATE 
CHANGE ACROSS GLOBAL WARMING’S SIX AMERICAS 2–3 (2010), available at http:// 
environment.yale.edu/climate/files/Knowledge_Across_Six_Americas.pdf. 
 82. TED NORDHAUS & MICHAEL SHELLENBERGER, BREAK THROUGH: FROM THE 
DEATH OF ENVIRONMENTALISM TO THE POLITICS OF POSSIBILITY 5–8 (2007). 
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be rejected in favor of promoting clean energy jobs and markets. 
Proposition 23 was defeated by a substantial margin.83 
B.  The Clean Energy Message 
Polls show that clean energy resonates with more Americans than 
climate change.  Americans are voracious consumers of energy; we are 
devoted to our cars, and we are becoming increasingly addicted to 
electronic consumer products.  We have enjoyed abundant and relatively 
cheap energy for decades.  Unfortunately, cheap energy is also dirty energy 
and continuing to consume fossil fuel-based energy is not sustainable. 
Our comfort, however, with cheap energy is such that the preference for 
clean energy or climate change is rooted, at least partly in an unwillingness 
to engage any significant change in lifestyle regarding energy and the 
environment.  Indeed, resistance to regulations that may affect lifestyle, 
including regulations promoting higher efficiency standards is noticeable. 
Witness the great light bulb conspiracy.  Pursuant to the bipartisan Energy 
Independence and Security Act of 2007 (“EISA”), signed into law by 
President Bush, efficiency standards were established for incandescent 
light bulbs.84  This efficiency standard has transmuted into a threat to 
American freedom as noted by the Texas legislature, which passed 
legislation intended to circumvent the federal law.85  In fact, the EISA 
does not outlaw incandescent lights but does require them to perform 
more efficiently.  This high-performance standard may have the effect of 
taking these bulbs off the market to be replaced by more efficient ones. 
Clearly, energy efficiency can come into play politically. 
Consequently, given past experience and our historic reliance on 
traditional energy, then, the clean energy message must contain particular 
elements.  First, and perhaps most importantly, a clean energy economy 
must continue to provide reliable energy at reasonable prices.  Second, 
and of equal importance, the new clean energy economy must create 
jobs.  Third, a clean energy economy should promote consumer choice, 
help small businesses and structure new markets.  In other words, a clean 
energy economy must be more competitive, must be open to new entrants 
and must encourage new investments. 
Those three elements constitute the positive dimension of a clean 
energy politics.  The negative dimension, what a clean energy politics is 
 83. See, e.g., Brookings Inst., America’s Energy Future: New Solutions to Fuel 
Economic Growth and Prosperity Forum, Panel Discussion: The Future of Energy and 
Climate Change Policy 11–13 (May 18, 2011) (transcript), available at http://www.brook 
ings.edu/~/media/Files/events/2011/0518_energy_future/20110518_panel2.pdf. 
 84. Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140 § 324 (2007). 
 85. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2004.003 (West 2011). 
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not, is more difficult, but no less necessary to convey.  A clean energy 
economy must not continue to pollute and must account for the social 
costs of carbon.  Because of negative externalities, a movement to a 
clean energy economy is an attempt to correct what is called the largest 
market failure in the world, i.e., global warming.86  A clean energy politics 
cannot deny the truth about global warming, nor can it deny a direct 
connection between energy efficiency and renewable resources relative to 
the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.  Nevertheless, the energy 
message must be distinct for climate change.  So much so, that a clean 
energy politics must be willing to oppose environmental NIMBY-ism.  
Clean energy projects, such as Cape Wind in Nantucket Sound, must 
be promoted with reasonable environmental reviews and accommodations, 
but must not be held hostage to old anti-growth environmental politics.87 
Clean energy politics must also distinguish itself from the traditional 
energy path that the country has followed for over a century.  Fossil fuel 
energy fouls the air, spoils lands, and pollutes water, it is responsible for 
a significant number of fatalities and disease because of those negative 
harms. A clean energy policy would reduce risks to health and life.  Given 
the magnitude, as well as the depth, of this market failure, government 
regulation is necessary. 
One way of understanding our production and consumption of energy 
is to analyze energy more as a public good than as a private one.  Of 
course, we treat our energy resources such as oil, gas, electricity and the 
like as privately owned and sold in open markets.  Indeed, these resources 
are private goods and yet as a matter of public policy, we have treated 
energy as a public good.  More accurately, we have treated cheap energy 
as a public good.  We do not include all of the costs of production in the 
price of a gallon of gas; nor do we price a ton of coal so that it includes 
all of its social costs because the full price of that gas and coal would be 
substantially higher.  Instead, it is the public policy of the U.S. to put as 
much cheap energy on the market as possible because the private sector 
has not fully accounted for the costs of pollution in its products. 
Clean energy, then, should receive the same treatment.  Clean energy 
is a public good that the private market will not fully provide because of 
 86. NICHOLAS STERN, A BLUEPRINT FOR A SAFER PLANET: HOW TO MANAGE CLIMATE 
CHANGE AND CREATE A NEW ERA OF PROGRESS AND PROSPERITY 7 (2009). 
 87. See, e.g., NORDHAUS & SHELLENBERGER, supra note 82, ch. 4; Katherine A. Roek, 
Offshore Wind Energy in the United States: A Legal and Policy Patchwork, 25 NAT. RES. 
& ENVT. 24, 24 (2011). 
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its cost.  Clean energy from efficiency or renewable resources or from 
clean fossil fuel technologies, will, at least initially, cost more than the dirty 
energy we currently consume.  The public goods nature of clean energy 
is that all the costs of production are included and that clean energy will 
also yield environmental goods for the general public that the private 
market will not fully supply.88 
The message, then, for clean energy advocates is that without government 
regulation, the benefits of a clean energy economy will not occur.  There 
are important concepts in this idea that a clean energy economy can only 
move forward with effective government regulations.  At one level, a clean 
energy politics must proceed independently of and not adopt the language 
of precaution and sustainability advocated by climate change advocates.89  
Instead, a clean energy politics promotes economic growth, not limits;90 
favors markets rather than command-and-control government; and, 
entertains the use of nuclear power and natural gas as transitional fuels. 
At a deeper level, a clean energy politics may require new economic 
models and a new vision of government.  The role of government in 
clean energy politics is not intended to be top-down, but it is intended 
that government serve as a partner, facilitator and significant actor in 
building and sustaining the new energy economy.  This new role may 
best be seen as government takes a more prominent role through innovation 
policy specifically intended to bring new energy technologies to commercial 
scale.91  Under the old R&D model, government solved problems and 
promoted specific technological fixes.  In the new model, government is 
agnostic regarding specific technologies but it is a believer in market 
solutions to energy and environmental challenges.92 
A clean energy politics, thus, is a broad-based approach to a significant 
sector of our economy.  It should not favor any particular industry over 
another.  Instead, this politics should be aligned with and complementary 
to issues such as healthcare, education, job creation and national security 
as well as environmental responsiveness and technological innovation.  
This “convergence” of policies perceives government as an active 
participant in maintaining a vibrant economy along a broad spectrum of 
 88. See generally Don Fullerton & Robert Stavins, How Economists See the 
Environment, 395 NATURE 433 (1998). 
 89. E.g., GIDDENS, supra note 6, at 10–11; NORDHAUS & SHELLENBERGER, supra note 
82, at 16–17. 
 90. See generally DIANE COYLE, THE ECONOMICS OF ENOUGH: HOW TO RUN THE 
ECONOMY AS IF THE FUTURE MATTERS 55–70 (2011). 
 91. See Tomain, Our Generation’s Sputnik Moment, supra note 2, at 389; DOE 
STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 5, at 1. 
 92. See, e.g., DEUTCH, supra note 1, at 5–7. 
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interests.93  In this regard, then, clean energy politics should be considered 
either non-partisan or post-partisan.94  Further, clean energy politics must be 
forward-looking rather than fight old battles; anticipate new problems 
rather than try and solve old ones; and seek to diminish government’s 
role going forward over time rather than entrench new bureaucracies.  A 
clean energy politics that is: oriented toward economic growth, responsive 
and sensitive to social costs, open and flexible to new markets and 
actors, recognizes global interconnections and a new role for American 
leadership and participation in a changing world economy, and is willing 
to go beyond shrill partisanship and embrace pragmatism may well be a 
paradigm for a new, more encompassing set of political commitments 
for all sectors of our society and economy. 
A clean energy politics, then, can be perceived, at once, as both 
mainstream and radical.  It is mainstream because of its focus on jobs, 
growth, competition and markets.  It is radical because it demands that 
we rethink the economic model95 we use to set policy and that we 
reconceive the role that government has in furthering those policies.  To 
be sure, a clean energy politics which seeks a radical transition away 
from fossil fuels and which seeks new models for the economy and for 
government regulation will not be cost free.  We turn now to the types of 
choices, including costs, that we are likely to confront during transition. 
IV.  TRAGIC, HARD, AND HEROIC CHOICES 
Any transition from one state of affairs or from one legal regime to 
another involves costs.96  And, any issue of costs requires difficult choices.  
 93. E.g., GIDDENS, supra note 6, at 8–9; NORDHAUS & SHELLENBERGER, supra note 
82, at 230. 
 94. See, e.g., Brookings Inst., America’s Energy Future: New Solutions to 
Fuel Economic Growth and Prosperity Forum, Keynote Remarks: Bipartisan Solutions to 
America’s Energy Challenges 2 (May 18, 2011) (transcript), available at http://www. 
brookings.edu/~/media/Files/events/2011/0518_energy_future/20110518_keynote.pdf; 
STEVEN F. HAYWARD ET AL., POST-PARTISAN POWER: HOW A LIMITED AND DIRECT APPROACH 
TO ENERGY INNOVATION CAN DELIVER CLEAN, CHEAP ENERGY, ECONOMIC PRODUCTIVITY AND 
NATIONAL PROSPERITY 5–7 (2010), available at http://thebreakthrough.org/blog/Post-Partisan 
%20Power.pdf. 
 95. See, e.g., Gar Aperlovitz, The New-Economy Movement, THE NATION (June 2011), 
http://www.thenation.com/article/160949/new-economy-movement; ROBERT D. ATKINSON & 
DARRENE HACKLER, ECONOMIC DOCTRINES AND APPROACHES TO CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY  
1 (Oct. 2010), available at http://www.itif.org/files/2010-econ-climate-change.pdf. 
 96. See, e.g., Michael P. Van Alstine, The Cost of Legal Change, 49 UCLA L. 
REV. 789, 812 (2002). 
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The better question is whether or not those choices are simply hard or 
whether or not, as a society; the choices we face are either tragic or 
heroic and likely involve difficult lifestyle choices.  Will the decision to 
move to a clean energy future be a decision made in the calm of reasoned 
deliberation, in the give-and-take of ordinary politics or under a sense of 
crisis?97  Regardless of the many estimates of the many possible worlds of 
energy transition, there is a consensus among policy analysts that the 
sooner the transition will occur, the cheaper it will be. 
Estimates and calculations regarding current cost to combat climate 
change are heavily contested, ranging from a manageable portion of 
GDP to a painful one.98  A transition from a fossil fuel policy to a clean 
energy policy will also involve costs, although reliable estimates are hard 
to come by.  Instead of specific or overall costs for a clean energy transition, 
we can identify the likely categories of cost increases.  Today, electricity 
from wind and solar power is more expensive than coal-fired electricity, 
and biofuels and shale oil are more expensive than conventional oil.  
Similarly, the cost of an electric vehicle or hybrid electric car is greater 
than one propelled by internal combustion engine but the cost of a kwh 
to run such cars is much cheaper that an equivalent gallon of gasoline.  
The good news is that efficiency and renewable energy costs are declining.  
In fact, new solar and wind installations in the U.S. are outpacing coal 
plants.  In the last four years, new wind generation was second only to 
natural gas and more than coal and nuclear power combined.99  Similarly, 
the cost of solar power is projected to be cut in half over the next 
 97. See, e.g., Thomas L. Friedman, The Earth is Full, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2011, at 
A23; see also MCKIBBEN, supra note 15; JEFFREY D. SACHS, COMMON WEALTH: ECONOMICS 
FOR A CROWDED PLANET (2008); THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, HOT, FLAT AND CROWDED: WHY 
WE NEED A GREEN REVOLUTION—AND HOW IT CAN RENEW AMERICA (2008); DAVID W. 
ORR, DOWN TO THE WIRE: CONFRONTING CLIMATE COLLAPSE ix–xiii (2009). 
 98. See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, HIDDEN COSTS OF ENERGY: UNPRICED 
CONSEQUENCES OF ENERGY PRODUCTION AND USE 21 (2010); STERN, THE ECONOMICS 
OF CLIMATE CHANGE: THE STERN REVIEW 3 (2007); RACHEL CLEETUS, STEVEN CLEMMER 
& DAVID FRIEDMAN, supra note 61, at 3–4; NATHANIEL KEOHANE & PETER GOLDMARK, 
WHAT WILL IT COST TO PROTECT OURSELVES FROM GLOBAL WARMING?: THE IMPACTS ON 
THE U.S. ECONOMY OF A CAP-AND-TRADE POLICY FOR GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 9 
(2008), available at http://www.edf.org/documents/7815_climate_economy.pdf; WILLIAM 
NORDHAUS, THE STERN REVIEW ON THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 3 (2006) 
(noting the risk of climate change is roughly 5% of the annual GDP); MARTIN 
WEITZMAN, THE STERN REVIEW OF THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 6–8 (2007) 
(arguing that the annual interest rate will be 6%); Kenneth J. Arrow, Global Climate 
Change: A Challenge to Policy, ECONOMIST’S VOICE, June 2007, at 5. 
 99. See Industry Statistics, AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, http://www.awea.org/learn 
about/industry_stats/index.cfm (last updated Aug. 4, 2011); see also Saya Kitasei, Wind 
Power Growth Continues to Break Records Despite Recession, in VITAL SIGNS 2011: 
THE TRENDS THAT ARE SHAPING OUR FUTURE 26–29 (Linda Stark ed., 2011) (indicating 
the rate of wind power growth between 2009 and 2010). 
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decade.100  Thus, savings are both possible and likely even more so once 
an alternative energy policy is fully adopted in which case substantial 
profits are predicted.101 
In the area of costs, we can also distinguish between climate change 
and clean energy.  In both instances, the range in the amount of costs 
will depend upon the rapidity of a transition.  When we speak about climate 
change we are talking about generations.  What will global temperature 
increases be 100 or 200 years from now?  When we speak about a 
transition to a clean energy economy, though, the time frames are shorter 
and we should not be put off by thinking in terms of at least one 
generation. 
Traditional industry proponents make two conflicting arguments.  
First, they argue that because of the volume of sunk capital costs in 
traditional energy that a transition to clean energy is unwise because 
sunk costs must be recovered.  Second, they argue that because we need 
energy now (i.e. we need economic growth), it will take too long to 
change our energy profile.  On the one hand, the argument is go slow for 
capital returns and on the other hand, the argument is that a transition 
will take too long at a risk to the economy.  Besides being contradictory, 
both arguments are unpersuasive.  First, regarding recouping investment, 
an energy transition will take time and sunk costs will be recovered, but 
not perpetually.  Private companies take on financial and business risks 
and are rewarded by the market for doing so.  They cannot continue to 
invest in old ways and expect that new entrants and competitors will sit 
on the sidelines.  To the extent that an energy firm is regulated, the Fifth 
Amendment prohibition against takings provides protection against 
government actions that significantly devalue a firm.  Further, regulatory 
history reveals that government regulators have protected utilities through 
rate treatment.  Private firms must take business and financial risks and 
they must expect competition.  A clean energy policy is based, in large 
part, on increased competition in energy markets.  Therefore, financial 
 100. See, e.g., Alex Knapp, The Cost of Solar Power is Expected to Decline 50% 
Over the Next Decade, FORBES (Apr. 6, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/alexknapp 
/2011/04/06/the-cost-of-solar-power-is-expected-to-decline-50-over-the-next-decade/. 
 101. See HANNAH CHOI GRANADE ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., UNLOCKING 
ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN THE U. S. ECONOMY passim (2009); ERIC BEINHOCKER ET AL., 
MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., THE CARBON PRODUCTIVITY CHALLENGE: CURBING CLIMATE 
CHANGE AND SUSTAINING ECONOMIC GROWTH passim (2008); DIANA FARRELL ET AL., 
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and business risks are inherent in a market economy and we cannot (and 
should not) expect government to bailout fossil fuel firms.  They have 
enjoyed government favor for too long. 
Second, the argument that an energy transition will take too long is 
equally spurious.  Any wise energy firm manager must think in generations.  
Think of the electric industry as an example.  If the utility decides to 
build a coal plant today, it will generate electricity in a few years and 
will generate that electricity for a generation or more.  Similarly, a 
that that plant will generate electricity within a decade.  If, however, such 
decision today to build a nuclear power plant means that it is unlikely a 
plant does come online, then it will generate electricity for at least 40 
years and, given the current state of renewing nuclear power plant 
licenses, will generate electricity for at least 60 years.  In other words, a 
decision to build a nuclear power plant today will last two generations.  
The point is a simple one, thinking in generations is something a prudent 
businessperson does in a capital intensive industry like energy; it is not 
an argument against transition. 
A similar go-slow or anti-transition argument involves consumer choice.  
The anti-green lobby argues, generally, that government regulation is 
unwise because it restricts individual liberty.  The idea behind this 
argument is that government regulation restricts the ambit of individual 
preferences and, therefore, regulation should be resisted.  Again, this 
argument is faulty for at least two reasons.  First, energy firms have 
enjoyed government support for over a century and have not competed 
in open, unfettered markets.  Consumer choice has been circumscribed 
in favor of dirty energy firms.  Second, to the extent that open and free 
markets maximize individual choice, they allow people to maximize the 
exercise of their preferences.  This argument is sound as far as it goes. 
But it does not go far enough.  People are not born, as if like Athena 
from the head of Zeus, with their preferences fully formed.102  No one has 
individual preferences uninfluenced by the external world. Otherwise there 
would be no advertising profession.  Markets can create demand, advertising 
can shape preferences, and, as social animals, our choices and preferences 
are influenced by those around us as well as by our own desires. 
Similarly, government activity, including regulation, affects our choices 
and preferences.  Forty years ago, for example, cars were not equipped 
with either air bags or safety restraints.  Today, not only are cars required 
to have them, consumers would not buy a car without them.  As consumers, 
 102. See, e.g., Samuel Bowles, Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of 
Markets and Other Economic Institutions, 36 J. ECON LIT. 75, passim (1998). 
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our preference for airbags was indeed shaped by government regulators.103  
Our desire to understand what is contained in the products we consume 
by reading nutrition labels and drug warnings has likewise been shaped 
by government regulators.  These lessons can be easily applied to a clean 
energy transition.  Regulations regarding product efficiency, efficient 
buildings, and efficient appliances, such as light bulbs, can be utilized to 
shape preferences for a clean energy transition.104 
As consumers, we have grown comfortable with recycling. As 
consumers we can learn to make choices among providers.  Consumers 
find it easier to choose among telephone service providers than among 
energy providers, nevertheless, the idea of choice of providers is the 
same for energy and telecommunications and may require public education; 
and clean energy choices may benefit from a “nudge” here and there.105  
Indeed, as consumers we have available any number of “apps” at out 
fingertips that allow us to compare prices and products from any number 
of energy firms.106  In brief, an energy transition will involve lifestyle 
choices, yet it is not obvious that the choices need to be dramatic nor is it 
obvious that lifestyle choices will be different in degree than those that 
we make routinely. 
The large issue, of course, will be cost to the consumer.  Today, it is 
the case that electricity from solar and wind projects are more costly 
than from coal-fired utilities.  This comparison of costs between these 
electricity sources, however, masks the fact that the social costs of carbon 
are not included in the price of coal-fired electricity.  Again, accurate 
estimates on leveled costs, i.e. the present value of the total cost of 
building and operating an electricity plant, from all of these sources, 
once pollution costs are included, are difficult to come by.  Nevertheless, 
critics of the clean energy policy also opposed environmental regulations 
that would acknowledge the cost of the externalities.  They cannot have 
it both ways.  The critics cannot pursue government favor for fossil fuels 
 103. See, e.g., SHAPIRO & TOMAIN, supra note 16, at 32; see generally PHILLIP J. 
COOPER, THE WAR AGAINST REGULATION: FROM JIMMY CARTER TO GEORGE W. BUSH 
33–34 (2009) (discussing the Reagan administration’s failure to rescind airbag 
regulations). 
 104. Contra Andrew Rice, Bulb Out, N.Y. TIMES SUNDAY MAG., June 5, 2011, at 
MM44. 
 105. See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS 
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 188–89 (2008). 
 106. See Apple and the Environment: Designed for Energy Efficiency, APPLE, http:// 
www.apple.com/environment/energy-efficiency/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2011). 
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and reject it for clean energy.  From a competitive market standpoint, for 
a true apples to apples comparison, though, the cost of all sources of 
energy, fully inclusive of all social costs, must be made.  The choice 
cannot be between clean energy and cheap, dirty energy.  In other words, 
a transition to clean energy may raise consumer prices and yet, if we are 
committed to a free market in energy, then we cannot ignore the full cost 
of its production. 
Along similar lines, the argument against government support of a 
clean energy transition is based on the idea that traditional fossil fuel 
industries have served the country well; that they have invested billions, 
if not trillions, of dollars in energy production and distribution; and, that 
“the market” signals a preference for traditional energy.  Again, this 
argument is spurious.  At the end of the 19th century, fossil fuel firms 
were competitive and were largely unregulated.  By the turn-of-the-century, 
government regulation of energy firms began, and before the mid-
twentieth century, they were heavily regulated.  The regulation of energy 
firms, however, was not terribly opposed by industry.  In fact, the energy 
industry flourished because of government support in the construction of 
infrastructure and with the financial subsidization of fossil fuel energy 
interests.  Today those subsidies continue. Historically, fossil fuel and 
nuclear firms have been the largest beneficiaries of government financial 
support.107  Recently, however, clean energy initiatives have been receiving 
more attention particularly through the American Reinvestment and 
Recovery Act of 2009 also known as the Stimulus Bill.108  Still, government 
support has firmly entrenched fossil fuel firms in our economy. 
Thus, the argument that clean energy industries should compete in a 
“free” market without government subsidies is disingenuous at best.  We 
might well agree that subsidies distort market operations and send 
flawed price signals to consumers and producers.  In fact, subsidies 
do have those effects.  The problem, and it is a political one, is that the 
history of energy regulation is so embedded with government incentives 
and subsidies that to now say that clean energy firms should not benefit 
is to prevent the leveling of the energy market playing field. 
The message for a clean energy politics, then, can acknowledge the 
existence of transition costs but can also argue that the longer the 
country waits to make the transition, the more costly it will be.  Further, 
the transition to clean energy can occur within a timeframe with which, 
as an industrial economy, we are familiar.  Building large-scale, capital-
 107. See, e.g., ENVTL. LAW INST., ESTIMATING U.S. GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES TO 
ENERGY SOURCES: 2002–2008, at 3 (2009). 
 108. See, e.g., Energy, SUBSIDYSCOPE, http://subsidyscope.org/energy/summary/ 
(last updated Sept. 9, 2010). 
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intensive energy plants and a national infrastructure is something with 
which we are quite familiar in the United States.  Building a clean energy 
economy that includes distributed as well as centralized power stations 
and promotes competition is easily within industry’s ability.  Additionally, 
government support is not anathema to the energy industry and can be 
essential to a transition that promises greater energy efficiency, new 
markets, and a new economy. 
A clean energy policy is transformative for several reasons all of 
which hold economic, as well as the environmental, promise.  Our country’s 
traditional energy path has been based on large-scale and highly centralized 
power production and distribution.  A green energy economy, even one 
that may contain nuclear power, can take a decidedly different form.  A 
clean energy economy can be decentralized and scaled-to-task.  Small 
nuclear power plants and other distributed generation can be built closer 
to end-users.  In this way, transmission and distribution costs are lowered, 
congestion on the grid can be reduced and energy efficiency can be 
increased.  Further, clean energy can be cost saving.  Increased energy 
efficiency is the lowest hanging fruit on the clean energy tree.  It is virtually 
costless and does not threaten economic growth.109 
The most significant aspect of the clean energy politics message is that 
the creation of the new energy economy is firmly based upon a belief in 
competitive markets.  For the last political generation of free-market 
rhetoric, i.e., the Regan Revolution or the period of neo-liberalism, the 
idea of competitive markets has been significantly skewed as the recent 
history of the Great Recession demonstrates.110  With truly competitive 
markets comes innovation, jobs, consumer choice and economic growth.  
The political debate about our energy future should not be obscured by 
the worn out dichotomy between government regulation and free markets.  
Workable and competitive markets cannot exist without government 
regulation.  Undoubtedly, a modern, particularly pluralist, democracy 
such as ours inevitably brings a clash of interests.  Nevertheless, a clean 
energy message is one firmly rooted in the values of democratic capitalism; 
 109. See GRANADE ET AL., supra note 101. 
 110. See, e.g., JOHN CASSIDY, HOW MARKETS FAIL: THE LOGIC OF ECONOMIC 
CALAMITIES passim (2009); JUSTIN FOX, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL MARKET: A HISTORY 
OF RISK, REWARD, AND DELUSION ON WALL STREET passim (2009); see JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, 
FREEFALL: FREE MARKETS, AND THE SINKING OF THE WORLD ECONOMY passim (2010); 
RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ‘08 AND THE DECENT INTO 
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that markets and innovation are primary engines for economic growth 
and are opportunities for greater market participation for producers and 
consumers rather than for a select few. 
There is no doubt that a clean energy future is hardly a panacea for 
many of the economic dislocations, such as health care and public 
education, that now plague us.  Nevertheless, the argument for continuing 
down a well-worn fossil fuel path has little, if anything, to recommend it.  
The largest complaints against transition are cost and lifestyle change, but 
these need not be abrupt nor catastrophic—unless we wait too long to 
engage in a transition.  Today, there are abundant signs that multiple 
sectors of our economy and our society are actively pursuing a transition 
to a clean energy future.  We are already on the smart path; we simply 
need to hasten our steps. 
V.  GOING FORWARD 
Clean energy politics offers the best promise for merging energy and 
the environment.  As noted above, public opinion is divided on matters 
of climate change but less so regarding clean energy.  Also noted above, 
Washington leadership on climate change will not occur in the near term.  
Even in the summer of 2011, the Environmental Protection Agency has 
been influenced by Republican opposition to slow down its release of 
rules curbing greenhouse gas emissions.111  Congressional leadership on 
clean energy is equally unlikely in the near term.  However, the Obama 
administration has invested political capital favoring clean energy 
initiatives through increased R&D for clean energy, a smart grid 
initiative112 and opposition to fossil fuel subsidies.  Additionally, the real 
politics of clean energy are occurring outside the Beltway and there is 
much activity in this new political landscape. 
The Academy.  Academics have been actively involved in energy 
policy studies for decades.  The reports from the 1970s were based on 
significant academic input.  Today, we can identify a new generation of 
academic activity involving energy and the environment.  Historically, 
university-based research centers tended to be fairly narrowly focused.  
The federal government contributed significant amounts of R&D funding 
 111. John M. Broder, E.P.A. Plans Delay of Rule on Emission, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 
2011, at A13. 
 112. See WHITE HOUSE, FACT SHEET: THE PRESIDENT’S PLAN FOR A 21ST CENTURY 
ELECTRIC GRID (2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ 
ostp/smart-grid-fact-sheet-6-13-2011.pdf; WHITE HOUSE, A POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR THE 
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along a wide range of scientific and technological activities.113  Under 
this model, a university research center had a particular client and was 
geared to solving a particular problem such as designing and testing a 
defense technology.  Even today, DOE funding tends to focus on specific 
technological issues such fuel cells or on basic scientific research on 
such matters as cold fusion.  Recently, however, the DOE has expanded 
its scope of energy related activities and has dedicated more financial 
support to non-defense energy projects.114  More specifically, DOE funding 
for clean energy is being spread out among a consortia of academic research 
centers and institutes, thus reflecting changes within the academy.115 
The proliferation of energy and environmental research centers in the 
academies is indicative of the significance of this issue.  The design of 
these research centers and institutes is more revealing.  Historically, a 
university, most often a college or a department within a university, would 
create a research center or institute for its own faculty who would compete 
for grants, contracts and other government awards.  Today, academic 
energy and environmental centers are multidisciplinary; they involve 
more than a single department, college or university. They engage outside 
researchers and some partner with private institutions.116 
Consistent with the design of these modern academic research centers 
is the output.  Formerly, the most frequent take-away from an academic 
research project was a report that went to the funder and was published 
in academic journals.  Today, these research centers continue to write 
reports and publish their work, however, the purpose and distribution of 
those reports is decidedly different.  The output of these modern institutions 
is intended (1) for a broad-based and multidisciplinary audience; (2) to 
have practical and commercial effects; and (3) to influence public policy.117  
The new academic research center, then, becomes an advocate and 
participant in the development of public policy and, therefore, becomes 
an actor on the clean energy politics stage. 
 113. TOMAIN, ENDING DIRTY ENERGY POLICY, supra note 4, at ch. 7. 
 114. TOMAIN, ENDING DIRTY ENERGY POLICY, supra note 4, at ch. 8. 
 115. See, e.g., OFFICE OF SCI. OF THE U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ENERGY FRONTIER 
RESEARCH CENTERS: TACKLING OUR ENERGY CHALLENGES IN A NEW ERA OF SCIENCE 2–
5 (2008) (describing a $100 million R&D fund for energy research consortia). 
 116. See, e.g., NICHOLAS INST. FOR ENVTL. POLICY SOLUTIONS, http://Nicholas 
institute.duke.edu/about/. 
 117. See, e.g., Policy Impact, BELFER CTR., http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/ 
about/policy-impact.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2011). 
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In addition to engaging in clean energy research and development, the 
academy is also expanding the study and education of clean energy and 
climate change in its undergraduate and graduate programs.118  Law 
schools are also offering areas of concentration and advanced degrees in 
this field119 and the number of symposia, journals, and other research is 
expanding noticeably.  Indeed, this law review, San Diego Journal of 
Climate & Energy Law, is a leading example of the special focus that legal 
educators and scholars place on clean energy and climate change. 
Philanthropy.  Over the last two decades or more, foundations and other 
philanthropies have been actively engaged in changing the way they do 
business.  In the past, the usual course of performance was for a foundation 
to either receive requests for grants or to send out a request for proposals 
in a particular area of interest such as arts or the environment.  The 
foundation, then, would review the proposals and award grants for those 
requests that satisfy the foundation’s mission.  The problem with this 
approach, not unlike a narrow vision of R&D funding, was that projects 
would be funded, reports would be written and they would gather dust 
on any number of shelves.  In short, philanthropic foundations began to 
realize that they were getting little return for their grant dollars and that 
their impacts in their communities were either unknown or negligible. 
In response to this recognition that foundation money accomplished 
little, forward thinking foundations began to reassess their missions and 
to reassess the way they did business.120  Foundations then began to 
 118. For an extremely short list of examples, see, e.g., MITEI Home, MASS. INST. OF 
TECH., http://web.mit.edu/mitei/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2011); Yale Climate & Energy Institute, 
YALE UNIV., http://climate.yale.edu/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2011); Climate, YALE UNIV., 
http://e360.yale.edu/topic/climate/005/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2011); Carbon Mitigation 
Initiative, PRINCETON UNIV., http://cmi.princeton.edu/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2011); Center 
for Sustainable Energy at Notre Dame, UNIV. NOTRE DAME, http://energy.nd.edu/ (last 
visited Sept. 9, 2011); Energy and Resources Group, UNIV. OF CAL., http://erg.berkeley. 
edu/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2011). 
 119. See, e.g., Institute for Energy and the Environment, VT. LAW SCH., 
http://www.vermontlaw.edu/Academics/Environmental_Law_Center/Institutes_and_Initiati
ves/Institute_for_Energy_and_the_Environment/Energy_Law_Certificate_and_Curriculu
m.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2011); Natural Resources Law Institute, LEWIS & CLARK LAW 
SCH., http://www.lclark.edu/law/programs/environmental_and_natural_resources_law/ 
natural_resources_law_institute/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2011); Center for Energy & 
Environmental Security, UNIV. COLO. LAW SCH., http://cees.colorado.edu/ (last visited Sept. 
9, 2011); SERL Program, UNIV. TULSA C. LAW, http://www.utulsa.edu/academics/ 
colleges/college-of-law/Centers%20and%20Institutes/National%20Energy-Environment 
%20and%20Law%20and%20Policy%20 Institute.aspx (last visited Sept. 9, 2011) (follow 
Sustainable Energy and Resources Law Program hyperlink); Energy and Climate Center 
PACE UNIV. LAW SCH., http://www.pace.edu/school-of-law/centers-and-special-programs 
/centers/energy-and-climate-center (last visited Sept. 9, 2011). 
 120. See, e.g., PAUL BREST & HAL HARVEY, MONEY WELL SPENT: A STRATEGIC 
PLAN FOR SMART PHILANTHROPY passim (2008); MATTHEW BISHOP, PHILANTHROCAPITALISM: 
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identify particular areas or fields of interest that they found to be critical 
for their communities.  They would then articulate detailed guidelines, 
dedicate monies to those activities and then develop tools for measuring 
any impact that their grants would have.121  Philanthropies took another 
turn when they began to concentrate on returns on their investments.  
Foundations began to engage in venture philanthropy, mission investing, 
social entrepreneurship or social investing.  The idea behind all of these 
movements is the same.  Foundation money should have an impact and 
one way of measuring impact is based on return.122  Those returns can be 
financial returns or measurable outcomes in the community. 
Perhaps the most notable examples of this type of philanthropy are the 
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the Clinton Global Initiative.  In 
both instances, these foundations have narrowly focused their investments 
with the specific intent of improving world health in the case of the 
Gates Foundation and of improving the environment in the case of 
the Clinton Initiative.  The approach has proven to be attractive to other 
donors and philanthropists as each foundation has received substantial 
gifts with a stipulation that the gifts be spent or invested for the explicit 
purpose of achieving results.  Warren Buffett’s $30 billion gift to the 
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation was given with the express promise 
that the gift be spent over a stated period of time.  Similarly Richard 
Branson’s $3 billion gift to the Clinton foundation was given with a 
stipulation that it would be invested in climate change projects that may 
yield returns.123 
Venture Capital.  Clean energy investment is expanding noticeably. 
Clean energy investing, however, is unlikely in the near term to attain 
the status of dot.com boom.  Not only is the country in a period of slow 
economic recovery from the Great Recession of 2008–2010, but clean 
HOW THE RICH CAN SAVE THE WORLD passim (2008); Michael Porter & Mark R. Kramer, 
Philanthropy’s New Agenda: Creating Value, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov.–Dec. 1999, at 121. 
 121. The mission of The Center for Effective Philanthropy, for example, is to “provide 
data and create insight so philanthropic funders can better define, assess, and improve 
their effectiveness—and, as a result, their intended impact.”  See About CEP, CTR. FOR 
EFFECTIVE PHILANTHROPY, http://www.effectivephilanthropy.org/index.php?page=about-
cep (last visited Sept. 9 2011). 
 122. See, e.g., MORE FOR MISSION INVESTING, http://moreformission.org/ (last visited 
Sept. 9, 2011). More for Mission is a research project housed and part of Harvard’s 
Hauser Center and has 96 participating foundations with $38 billion in total assets. 
 123. See, e.g., Mark Kramer et al., Maximizing Impact: An Integrated Strategy 
for Grantmaking and Mission Investing in Climate Change, FOUND. STRATEGY GRP. 
(May 2010), available at http://www.fsg.org/tabid/191/ArticleId/65/Default.aspx. 
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energy has a significant unknown that contributes to financial risk.  
Quite simply, investors cannot rely on current price signals.  First, clean 
energy investing would greatly benefit from a carbon price.  It could also 
benefit from a stable oil price, but oil prices have been volatile for 
decades.  Second, clean energy investors cannot rely on predictable clean 
energy subsidies and financial support from the federal government.  
Tax and production incentives for solar and wind, for example, have 
been established by government but most often for two or three years at 
a time.  Nevertheless, the clean energy market has attracted investors 
and is yielding profitable initial public offerings (“IPOs”) that attract 
capital investments.  The ultimate success for venture capital, of course, 
is profit and in the VC world profit comes in the form of initial public 
offerings.  Recent IPOs include Tesla Motors,124 the maker of premium 
electric cars; Gevo,125 an advanced biofuels company; Amyris,126 another 
biotech firm; and, Solazyme,127 manufacturers of renewable oils from plant 
sugars. 
Globally, over the last decade, clean investments have been remarkable.  
Pew Charitable Trusts reports an average compound annual growth rate 
of 39% for clean energy investments between 2004 and 2009.128  The 
solar and wind markets, for example went from $6.5 billion in 2000 to 
$131.6 billion in 2010.  Growth in the clean tech market in 2010 
increased 30.2% over 2009 reaching $188.1 billion with the bulk of that 
growth consisting of a doubling of solar PV installations.  Most recently, 
Google announced its investment of $280 million in SolarCity, a company 
that makes residential solar rooftop installations.129  In the United States, 
less than 1% of venture capital was invested in clean tech in 2000 and 
more than 23% invested in clean tech in 2010.130  There are multiple 
clean and green venture capital (“VC”) firms and intermediary companies 
investing in clean energy markets and the volume of investment is 
 124. TESLA MOTORS, http://www.teslamotors.com/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2011). 
 125. GEVO, http://www.gevo.com/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2011). 
 126. AMYRIS, http://www.amyrisbiotech.com (last visited Sept. 10, 2011). 
 127. SOLAZYME, http://www.solazyme.com (last visited Sept. 10, 2011). 
 128. The Growth of Clean Energy Industries Through Climate, PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL 
CLIMATE CHANGE (July 2010), available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/ 
policy-memo-8-growth-clean-energy-industries-through-legislation.pdf. 
 129. Tiffany Hsu, Google Creates $280-Million Solar Power Fund, L.A. TIMES 
(June 14, 2011), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-google-solar-20110 614,0,42896 
67.story. 
 130. See Ron Pernick et al., Clean Energy Trends 2011, CLEAN EDGE (Mar. 2011), 
available at http://cleanedge.com/reports; see also Green Investing 2011: Reducing the Cost 
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increasing.131  In the first quarter of 2010, VC investments were estimated 
to be $733.3 million, up 68 percent from the previous year.132  It is also 
notable that VC firms are acutely aware of the political dimension of 
clean energy markets. 
For example, the California venture capital firm of Kleiner Perkins 
named former Vice President Al Gore as a partner working in their 
Greentech division.  Greentech has an investment portfolio intended to 
promote clean power, clean water and clean transportation as the world’s 
population continues to urbanize.  Kleiner Perkins invests in early-stage 
breakthrough ventures that promise to create new markets.  To date, they 
have invested in nearly two-dozen companies ranging from geothermal 
development of biofuels to solar power through renewable fuel cells 
powered by oxygen and hydrogen.133 
One Kleiner Perkins alumnus, Vinod Khosla, began his own venture 
capital firm, Khosla Ventures, and named former British Prime Minister 
Tony Blair as senior advisor.  The firm has dedicated more than $1 
billion for clean and information technologies.  Khosla Ventures focuses 
on building sustainable companies through leveraging relationships and 
building teams to assist new firms in becoming billion-dollar businesses.134  
The firm’s clean energy portfolio runs from battery development and 
building materials to utility-scale generation and cellulosic alcohol.  It 
has invested in nearly four dozen clean tech companies such as Altarock 
Energy, which develops engineered geothermal systems and in Calera, a 
company that has developed a process of capturing carbon dioxide and 
other emissions including mercury, and converting those pollutants into 
sustainable building materials and water.135 
 131. GREEN VENTURE CAPITAL, http://www.ecobusinesslinks.com/green_venture_ 
capital.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2011). Greentech Media provides research, 
information, and programming on a full range of clean energy initiatives including solar, 
the smart grid, VC investments, energy efficiency, and other topics.  GREENTECH MEDIA, 
http://www.greentechmedia.com/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2011).  See also Shikar Ghosh & 
Ramana Nanda, Venture Capital Investment in the Clean Energy Sector HARV. BUS. SCH. 
(Aug. 1, 2010), available at http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/11-020.pdf. 
 132.  Electric Vehicle and Energy Efficiency Developments Drive 733 Million Venture 
Capital Investment in U.S. Cleantech Market Q1 2010, ERNST & YOUNG (May 6, 2010), 
http://www.ey.com/US/en/Newsroom/News-releases/Electric-vehicle-and-energy-efficie 
ncy-developments-drive-USD-733-million-venture-capital-investment. 
 133. Innovative Portfolio Companies, KPCB, http://www.kpcb.com/portfolio/portfolio. 
php?greentech (last visited Sept. 10, 2011). 
 134. KHOSLA VENTURES, http://www.khoslaventures.com/khosla/firm.html (last visited 
Sept. 10, 2011). 
 135. CALERA, http://www.calera.com/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2011). 
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The approach of these two VC firms is instructive.  Both are invested 
in a range of clean and green technologies.  The investments are intended to 
bring new technologies to scale as well as build sustainable businesses.  
Further, both firms approach the greening of our energy economy by 
realizing the necessity of not only partnering with other firms but with 
having the public and private sectors linked to expand these markets.  It 
is no accident that people such as Al Gore, Colin Powell, and Tony Blair 
have become attractive to VC firms.  These former national and 
international leaders have joined these firms to open doors, help build 
coalitions, and broaden the base for new energy initiatives as well as 
respond to climate change challenges.  More importantly, the linkage 
between venture capital and political clout underscores the pervasive 
geopolitics of energy.  The history of fossil fuels is a history of 
government support.  To effectively counter that history, a clean energy 
future must well understand the old energy politics just as it must create 
a new one. 
Non-Governmental Energy Organizations.  It is unsurprising that with 
the federal government heavily involved in both traditional and clean 
energy funding and projects, trade associations and other organizations 
would form to influence policy and to garner benefits.  Traditional trade 
associations such as the American Petroleum Institute, the National 
Mining Association, and the Chamber of Commerce have been actively 
involved in lobbying Congress against climate change legislation and in 
favor of traditional fossil fuels for decades.  So it stands to reason that 
industry-specific clean energy associations such as the American Wind 
Association and the Solar Electric Power Association would also form to 
lobby Congress.  Traditional trade associations, of course, are simply 
business as usual.  What is more interesting relative to clean energy politics 
is the formation of non-traditional trade associations. 
Organizations such as the United States Climate Action Partnership, 
the American Energy Innovation Council, The Climate Action Network, 
and the American Council on Renewable Energy, were intentionally 
created to bring together a diverse group of actors such as utilities and 
environmentalists, businesspersons, and academics, as well as public and 
private sector institutions.  These organizations are distinguishable from 
traditional trade associations on a number of fronts.  Where old-line trade 
associations narrowly focus on the interests of their membership, these 
new non-governmental energy organizations (“NGEOs”) have a broader 
focus on clean energy policy in general and in the commercialization of 
clean energy technologies in particular.  These NGEOs are also actively 
engaged in coalition building, looking to build public and private support 
for a broad-based national clean energy policy. 
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The NGEOs perceive their advocacy as less ideological and more 
nonpartisan than organizations such as Center for American Progress or 
the Cato Institute, although of course, these think tanks would be welcome 
to the discussion.  These new NGEOs are policy oriented, produce research 
and reports for public consumption, and engage in public education as a 
necessary component of their work.  Additionally, these organizations 
perceive government as facilitator and partner that can play a supporting 
role in developing clean energy markets and technologies for the long 
term. 
Social Networks.  Perhaps the most interesting phenomenon in clean 
energy politics is the emergence of social networks dedicated to 
addressing clean energy and climate change.  Traditional energy firms 
are also using social networking.136  Organizations such as Focus the 
Nation137 and 350.org138 are committed to civic engagement and rely on 
social network communications on the Internet, Twitter, Facebook and 
the like to organize activities, promote their agenda and educate their 
followers. 
In 2011, for example, Focus the Nation advertised 20 clean energy 
fora around the country.139  In addition, the organization has a number of 
programs throughout the country, has developed a wide range of 
partnerships, and publicizes clean energy news on its website. 350.org 
was founded by author Bill McKibben and, like Focus the Nation, 
embraces social engagement, publicizes its rallies over the Internet, and 
has had remarkable success in spreading its mission throughout the 
country and the world.  Also, like Focus the Nation, 350.org provides 
a good deal of content on its website, including the science of climate 
change. 
The social movements of the 1960s had their day, and while it is 
unlikely that we will see similar types of demonstrations and rallies, it is 
now time for social activism to take a new form.  In the Facebook and 
Twitter age, the new form is the social network.  Interacting, communicating, 
learning, and organizing are all facilitated by handheld devices that put 
 136. Carolyn Elefant, The “Power” of Social Media: Legal Issues and Best Practices 
for Utilities Engaging Social Media, 23 ENERGY L.J. 1 (2011), available at http:// 
www.felj.org/docs/elj321/13_1_social_media.pdf. 
 137. FOCUS THE NATION, http://www.focusthenation.org/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2011). 
 138. See 350.ORG, http://www.350.org/en/. (last visited Sept. 10, 2011). 
 139. See Interactive Map, FOCUS THE NATION, http://www.focusthenation.org/focus-
nation (last visited Sept. 10, 2011). 
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us in touch with people across the globe as easily as next door.  It is fitting 
that matters of energy and the environment employ communications 
technologies in an attempt to change policy and develop a clean energy 
politics and to do so through public education and broad civic 
engagement.140 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The model of government regulation applied here requires that any 
regulatory proposal satisfy three requirements—law, policy and politics. 
Clean energy can easily meet the legal and policy elements.  From a 
policy perspective, all recent energy studies argue that a move away 
from Middle East oil is valuable for our national security.  Indeed, the 
argument for oil independence has been with us for over a generation 
with no signs of progress and only increasing reliance on an increasingly 
tense part of the world.  The Arab Spring of 2011 may show citizen 
dissatisfaction with despotic regimes.  That dissatisfaction may result in 
more democratic governments but it is far from clear that new Arab 
government will look favorably on the United States and its energy 
predicament.  Therefore, the need for energy security is heightened. 
The recent policy studies also pay more than lip service to the 
environment.  Greenhouse gas emissions have environmental and human 
health costs and those costs are not passed on to consumers in energy 
prices.  Economically, the uncompensated social costs send inaccurate 
price signals thus distorting energy markets as the reports referenced 
above recognize.  Further, these studies are bullish on new energy 
markets, new entrants into those markets and new energy technologies 
and innovations.  In short, new markets translate into more competition 
and more competition translates into more jobs in a new and expanding 
sector of the economy—the clean energy sector. 
From the legal perspective, there is good and bad news.  As for the 
fundamental regulatory tools needed to achieve these gains, those tools, 
e.g., standards, disclosure, price regulation etc., are readily available and 
have been applied to energy industries for over a century.  Herein lies 
the rub.  As noted above, interest groups will fight over and contest the 
application of many legal rules as the transition from one energy paradigm 
to another takes place.  Nevertheless, the fundamental constitutional 
legitimacy and the settled statutory experience of energy regulations are 
sound. 
 140. See, e.g., Al Maiorino, Social Media in the Renewable Energy World, ENVTL. 
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The issue, then, is whether or not a clean energy politics can develop 
so as to spur Congress to take a leadership role and rationalize clean 
energy rules for national application.  The most significant political action 
from Congress to advance a clean energy policy would be to set either a 
hard number for emissions or a hard number for the price of carbon.  In 
either case, clean energy investors can better assess financial risk and 
dedicate their money accordingly.  What both of those numbers have in 
common, though, is that they are measures of climate change and it is 
climate change that is the stumbling block to a clean energy politics.  
Indeed, to the extent that even Congress is addressing energy issues, 
ethanol subsidies for example, it is politics as usual as legislators watch 
out for their own constituencies.141  Given the dichotomy in our national 
conversation between climate change and clean energy, the political 
message should be clear.  Politicians and the public are both more 
comfortable and more receptive to discussions about energy than they are 
about climate change.  Consequently, as a clean energy agenda develops 
and as a clean politics advances, a focus on clean energy is likely to 
yield a greater reception. 
This article is an attempt to broadly describe a clean energy politics. 
The first lesson is simple—focus on energy, not on global warming.  The 
second lesson is equally obvious—Congress is in gridlock as long as 
climate change and clean energy are mingled together.  The third lesson 
may well be the most important—clean energy policy advocates are in 
abundance; they appear in every sector of society; the private sector is 
investing money; public actors at the state and local levels are adopting 
and implementing clean energy programs; and, public opinion favors a 
clean energy transition.  In short, today’s clean energy politics is bottom-
up and its success can be advanced once Washington takes notice of 
what is happening beyond the Beltway. 
 141. See, e.g., Carl Hulse, Effort to End Tax Credit for Ethanol Fails in Senate, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2011, at A16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/ 
15/us/politics/15senate.html; see also Jennifer Steinhauer & Carl Hulse, A Tough Day 
for Farmers as Lawmakers Look for Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2011, at A22, available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/17/us/17congress.html?_r=1&seid=auto&smid=tw-
nytimes&pagewanted=all.  These Senates vote are double-edged for clean energy.  On 
the one hand, the tax credits go to non-fossil fuels.  On the other hand, to the extent that 
they are used for highly inefficient corn ethanol that does not advance a clean energy 
agenda.  Rather, the vote indicates that partisan politics is alive and well and responsive to 
coalition bipartisan building. 
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